ON
NATUEE AND GRACE.
A THEOLOGICAL TREATISE. ^M1
BOOK I.
BY
WILLIAM GEOEGE WARD, D.Pn.
LATE LECTUEER IN DOGMATIC THEOLOGY AT ST. EDMUND'S SEMINARY HERTS.
LONDON :
BURNS AKD LAMBERT, 17 PORTMAN STREET, PORTMAN SQ.
MDCCCLX.
{The ngM of Translation is reserved.}
'
LONDON: Printed by G. BARCLAY, Castle St. Leicester Sq.
To His Eminence, Nicholas, Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster,
My dear Lord Cardinal,
IT was you who placed me in my position at St. Edmund's ; and you were kind enough to express much regret, when the failure of health and other circumstances of a private character necessitated my abandoning it. To whom therefore can I so suitably dedicate the first publication which re- sults from that position ?
It might seem indeed that some apology is needed, for venturing on this dedication, without having first solicited your Eminence's permission. My only reason for not asking it, has been my
iv DEDICATION.
anxiety to prevent the possibility of any one supposing, that you are in any way responsible for the contents of this volume. At the same time I need hardly add, what deep gratification it would afford me, so far as I should find you to approve what I have written, and to approve the fact of my writing it.
I am most glad of the present opportunity, to give expression, and so relief, to my feelings of gratitude, for the constant kindnesses which I have received from your Eminence : kindnesses, which have continued uninterruptedly to the pre- sent time, from a period preceding by several years my reception into the Church. My personal obligations to you indeed, of which this very volume reminds me, are far greater than you are perhaps at all aware. To your kind confidence I owe, what I have ever regarded as the chief blessing and privilege of my external Catholic life ; my connection with the Seminary. To you I am hidebted for seven years, far happier than any which I ever before spent ; and far happier than any others are at all likely to be, on this side the grave. To you I owe it, that during those years I have been rescued from the dull and wearisome routine of secular life in the world; and allowed to bear a part, however indirect, in
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one of the very noblest works which can possibly occupy the intellect or engage the affections, — the training of ecclesiastical students for the fulfilment of their high vocation.
Yet at last the personal obligations to you under which I lie, are as nothing compared with the obligations, resting on public grounds, which I share in common with the whole Catholic Church in England. I feel most deeply, that the prin- ciples of government and administration, which you have introduced and maintained amongst us, are our one hope, under God, for the real and solid promotion of Catholicism, in this our country. That it may be God's pleasure to re- establish you in perfect health, and to preserve for His Church in England the inestimable benefit of your government and counsels, — this is at the present moment the frequent and earnest prayer of many devoted hearts.
On these three grounds, I trust that you will not consider me as obtrusive or inoppor- tune, when I ask to place this volume under your Eminence's patronage. I offer it to you, as the first-fruits, if I may so express myself, of that vocation to which you summoned me. I offer it, as an inadequate expression of gratitude, for per- sonal kindnesses which I can never forget. I offer
VI DEDICATION.
it still more earnestly, as a humble contribution on my part to the general sum of grateful acknow- ledgment, which is due to you from the whole English Church.
In entering then on my most anxious theo- logical enterprise, I entreat your Eminence's bless- ing on myself and on my work. And I beg to subscribe myself,
With deep respect,
Your ever affectionate and grateful Servant,
W. G. WARD.
PREFACE.
I AM hoping, if God enables me, to publish a theological treatise on c Nature and Grace,' founded on part of my course at St. Edmund's. In offering then to the public this first volume of the intended work, I shall reasonably be expected in the first place to explain, what is that portion of Theology, which I mean to express by the above title. I will answer this question as briefly as I can ; for its full consideration belongs to the second volume. In order however to answer it at all, it is necessary to attempt some general chart or map of theological science as a whole.
The recognised model for a scientific arrangement of Theology, is St. Thomas's 4 Surnma.' This great work is divided into three parts, of which the contents are as follows : —
The 4 Pars Prima ' begins with ' de Deo/ and pro- ceeds to 4 de Trinitate.7 So far it is one connected whole, in the strictest sense; for the doctrine which concerns the latter, absolutely and entirely depends on that which concerns the former. In addition to these fundamental doctrines, the 4 Pars Prima ' contains cer- tain minor matters, on which we need not further
Vlli PREFACE.
dwell : such as ' de Angelis ; ' and a certain, some- what miscellaneous, assortment of subjects, which stand in later treatises under the general head c de Deo Creatore.'
The ' Pars Secunda ' makes a fresh start altogether : and resting its foundation on'the observed facts of human nature, proceeds to consider the various constituents of human action ; the rules of life obligatory on man ; the nature of virtue and vice; and other matters of the same kind : finally crowning the whole with the doctrine of Divine Grace. It is divided into two portions, the la 2ffi, and 2a 2s6 : the former of which proceeds scientifi- cally over the ground which I have just mentioned ; while the latter considers various virtues and vices in particular, with their appertaining circumstances.
The 'Pars Tertia' is on the Incarnation and the Sacraments. Any treatment of the Incarnation must include two things. First, it must include a treatment of the Hypostatic Union : and this must necessarily be based on the doctrine c de Trinitate ; ' for it is only by mastering first that doctrine which concerns the Second Person in Himself, that we can possibly study the further doctrine, of His assuming human nature. The other portion, necessarily included in any treatment of the Incarnation, comprises all questions concerning the human soul and body which have been thus assumed. These questions depend on matters treated in the ' Pars Secunda.' We wish to know for instance, what are the endowments of Christ's soul ; what Grace visits it ; what Grace inhabits it : this presupposes the whole doctrine of Grace in general. The doctrine of the Incarnation then is a kind of bridge, uniting the c Pars
PREFACE. IX
Prima ' with the ' Pars Secunda.' Part of St. Thomas's doctrine in the ' Pars Tertia ' depends on the ' Pars Prima,' and part on the 'Pars Secunda;' but the 'Pars Prima ' and ' Pars Secunda ' themselves are mutually independent.
On reviewing then the -whole 'corpus' of Theo- logy, so far as S. Thomas's ' Summa ' may be taken as representing it,* we shall find its organic structure to be of the following kind. Its foundation is composed of two independent portions; and its superstructure rests upon both. There are one or two doctrinal matters indeed, which can hardly be considered as integral parts of this scientific structure at all ; which can be studied as satisfactorily, in one order as in another. But in regard to far the greater number of doctrines, the case is otherwise ; and it is of very considerable importance, if we wish to master them at all thoroughly, that we study them in their due scientific place.
* A remark has been made to me by a friend of mine, a priest, which appears true ; though it so unconnected with our immediate subject, that I cannot do more than most briefly allude to it.
He considers that St. Thomas's ' Summa' is incomplete, in its theological plan, as containing no sufficient treatment of the ' De Ecclesia.' ' There are three elements,' he observes, ' required to make a good product in concreto from theological teaching : —
1. Scientific teaching of dogma.
2. Its ascetic correlative, i.e. the personal.
3. The life of the citizen of the Kingdom.1
St. Thomas's Theology, he proceeds in effect to say, does not include any sufficient foundation for the latter requisite. ' Our present Theology,' he observes, 'seems to be a stranger to any scientific handling of the two societies, which, as St. Augustine says, dispute possession of the world ; the Civitas Terrena and the Civitas Ccelestis.'
I think that these remarks are well founded ; and that a full treatise 'De Ecclesia,' succeeding, and based upon, the treatise 'De Incarnatione,' is indispensable for a complete theological corpus.
X PEEFACE.
It will be asked, what I mean by this phrase, ' independent ' portions of science ; and a ready illus- tration is at hand. Mathematics is one science, just as Theology is ; yet in its earlier and more rudimental teaching, it is made up of two ( independent' portions, — Algebra and Geometry. Algebra may be studied before Geometry, or Geometry before Algebra ; because (as I have said) they are 'independent' portions of science. On the other hand, in Geometry you cannot study the fourth book of Euclid before the first ; nor in Algebra can you study equations before addition and subtraction. So in Theology. It is impossible to understand the ' de Deo Trino,' till we have studied the 4de Deo Uno ;' and it is impossible to understand the ' de Gratia,' till we have studied the 4 de Actibus Humanis.' But that portion of science on the one hand, which contains the ' de Deo Uno et Trino;' — and that portion, on the other hand, which contains the ' de Actibus Humanis' and ' de Gratia;' — these are mutually independent : it is a matter of indifference, which is studied before the other. Lastly, upon these two independent portions is founded the doctrine of the Incarnation, and all which follows.
That portion of Theology then, to which I give the title ' On Nature and Grace,' is the latter of those two independent portions above mentioned. It includes all those revealed truths, which relate directly to each man's moral and spiritual action or condition : all those which concern his individual relations with God His true End ; whether he be tending towards that End, or moving unhappily in the opposite direction.
These truths, as will at once be manifest, are
PREFACE. XI
almost exclusively confined to the contents of S. Thomas's 'Pars Secunda:' yet there are one or two additional matters, which it falls within my plan to introduce. One of these is the state of Original Justice. How can the doctrine of Grace be understood, without considering Original Sin ? Or how can the doctrine of Original Sin be understood, without considering Original Justice? The propriety of this introduction then, is (I hope) most obvious.
There is another assemblage of truths, which I hope to introduce from the 'Pars Prima ;' viz. those which appertain to God's Providence and Predestination. A moment's thought will shew, how completely these truths are included within the description which I gave, as to that portion of Theology which I undertake ; for nothing can more closely concern man's individual relations with God his True End. The doctrine of Providence and Predestination, just as the doctrine of Grace itself, considers, on the one hand, the effect of God's Agency on man's free acts ; and considers, on the other hand, the reciprocal bearing of man's free acts on God's Counsels and Agency. The connexion between the two is close and indissoluble.
Once more. The doctrine of Justification is most strictly within the compass of this treatise. And yet it is impossible fully to discuss it, unless we carefully consider the qualities of that ' attrition,' which suffices for an adult's justification in the sacraments of Baptism and Penance. Thus we are led to some little encroach- ment on the ' Pars Tertia.'
Still on the whole, this treatise, as I have said, will not go beyond the ground covered by the 'Pars
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Secunda.' And it will naturally divide itself into five Books, of very unequal length; as follows : —
Book 1st. Philosophical Introduction.
Book 2d. Theological Prolegomena.
Book 3d. On Man's Moral Action.
Book 4th. On Divine Grace.
Book 5th. On God's Providence and Predestination.
The titles of the three last Books sufficiently explain their intended contents. In the second Book, I hope to include two different subjects. Firstly, I hope to consider the general nature and character of Theology; with so much, at least, of detail and ex- plicitness, as may give us means of assigning their true relative values, to the various * loci,' or sources, from which our theological arguments will be derived. And further, I hope to include in the same Book a theological treatment (so far as such is necessary) of those various philosophical principles, which we shall have established in this, the first Book.
So much then, on the general contents of the Books which are to follow. I must now refer, in somewhat greater detail, to the contents of this first Book, which is now presented to the public. And as it purports to be the 'philosophical introduction' to a * theological treatise,' it will be necessary, by way of preliminary explanation, to say something on the relation between Philosophy and Theology. This also is to be one of the matters handled in the second Book; and it will here therefore be treated with the greatest attainable brevity.
PREFACE. Xlll
THEOLOGY and Philosophy agree with each other in being sciences : in what do they differ ? The answer which meets us on the surface, is of the following kind. 4 Theology and Philosophy are mutually ex-
* elusive. Philosophy is produced, by Reason exercising ' itself on those data, which Reason itself declares ;
* Theology, by Reason exercising itself on those data, 4 which are known only by Revelation. If a truth can ' be deduced from Reason and Experience alone, it ' appertains to Philosophy ; if it can only be known ' through Revelation, to Theology/
But one single instance will sufficiently shew, that there is some inaccuracy in this statement. All Catholics agree in holding, as a truth which Reason alone is able to establish, that there exists that Being, Infinite in all Perfections, Whom we call God. From this datum, thus given by Reason, Reason is able readily to deduce all God's principal Attributes : His Aseity, Simplicity, Eternity, Immensity, Immutability, Sanctity, Omniscience, Omnipotence. It would follow then, from the distinction above attempted between Theology and Philosophy, that a consideration of these Attributes is totally external to the province of Theology. Yet it is difficult to imagine a conclusion, more opposed to the Church's universal and continuous practice, and more repugnant to the instinctive feeling of every theologian, than such a statement would be. And the very same reasoning holds, in regard to certain other most important matters of doctrine, which shall pre- sently be mentioned. It is necessary therefore, some- what to revise the above statement : and a very little consideration indeed will enable us to see its fallacy.
PREFACE.
Theology is produced by the exercise of Reason on those truths, which the Apostles committed to the Church's custody. This is admitted on all hands. Now it is implied, in the distinction just now attempted between Theology and Philosophy, that all these truths are in such sense supernatural, that Reason by itself would be wholly unable to establish them. But there cannot be a greater mistake, than to suppose that all revealed truths are of this kind : and this I now proceed to shew.
Certainly no announcement occupied a more promi- nent place in the apostolic teaching, than this ; that a Divine Person, clothed in human nature, had visited this earth ; that He had died an atoning death ; that upon that death He had built an Universal Church. Now it was impossible for the Apostles to teach this doctrine, without teaching in its company the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity ; and it was impossible for them to teach the Trinity, unless there already existed a clear and full apprehension of the Divine Unity. But go where they might externally to Juda3a, the great mass of the people had totally lost their hold of this funda- mental Verity. The revival then, in all their purity, of those doctrines concerning God, which Reason by it- self is able to establish, — this was among the very first enterprises, which it was necessary for the Apostles to set on foot. These doctrines, as all must admit, are to the full as integral and indispensable a part of the Apo- stolic teaching, as are the Trinity and the Incarnation.
But again. This Person, as being the Incarnate God, was to be The One Pattern and Exemplar of Sanctity in the Church through every age. Will any
PREFACE. XV
one say, that the ideal of virtuousness, then prevalent in the heathen world, approached ever so distantly to this Divine Type? Here then was another achievement, which it was absolutely necessary to accomplish. The prevalent ideal of virtuousness was to be radically reformed ; the existing notions of good and evil were to be almost revolutionized ; in one word, the Natural Law was to be republished. It was simply impossible, that our Lord should be accepted as the Model of Life, unless this other task, — republishing the Natural Law, — were also successfully undertaken. I may add also, it was simply impossible that the doctrines of Divine Grace should be preached, unless the faithful were enabled to understand, what is the nature and character of that true and solid virtue, which Grace is to generate in their souls.
But in truth there is a reason, even deeper than either of these two, why the republication of true moral prin- ciples was so absolutely indispensable an element of Christian teaching. Why did God the Son clothe Himself in our nature and die on the Cross ? that He might raise men to salvation hereafter, by raising them to sanctity here. Sanctity and salvation, — here is the very end for which Christianity was given. Cer- tainly then it cannot contain any more more vital or more integral doctrine, than its declaration of what sanctity is.
There is a considerable body of Truth then, which is in itself capable of being established by Reason ; but which is nevertheless so primary and prominent a part of the Christian Revelation, that no other whatever can possibly be more so. Theology, it is true, is founded exclusively on ' principia revelata :' I only say, that of
XVI PREFACE.
these 'principia revelata,' there are some most impor- tant and essential, which might have been known by Reason had there been no Revelation.* This body of Dogma belongs as simply and absolutely to Theology, as do the very doctrines of the Trinity or of Habitual Grace : and yet in another very true sense, it belongs to Philosophy also. It is desirable to give it a special name ; and I might be tempted to call it ' Theological Philosophy,' were it not that this term would be so often understood in a totally different sense, as express- ing the philosophy, or rationale, of Theology. I will call this body of Truth, then, the ' Higher Philosophy ;' using this term in a somewhat technical sense.
This Higher Philosophy will be found to consist of three principal divisions: (1) the doctrines ' de Deo Uno;' (2) the truths of Morality ; (3) various portions of Ethical Psychology. On the two former divisions we have already spoken. In regard to Ethical Psy- chology, the term is explained in the present volume, p. 193. And in support of my statement, that various parts of this science belong in the strictest sense to Theology, let such questions as the following be duly considered. How far is it possible, without prayer, to resist grave temptation, or keep the sum of God's Commandments? How far is it possible to preserve the remembrance of God throughout the day, amidst the jar and tumult of every-day life ? How far is it true, that, in our fallen state, our will is weaker in the good than in the evil direction? How far are we necessitated to aim at our own felicity ? These and
* See St. Thomas, 2* 2ae, q. 2, a. 4.
PREFACE. XV 11
many other questions of the same kind, it is manifest, are most strictly theological ; they are such as the Apostles must certainly have answered one way or other, when delivering that body of doctrine, which is to raise us towards sanctity. On the other hand, these same questions are no less strictly psychological ; and are amenable to the tribunal of consciousness and experience. Then consider the great stress, laid by St. Paul- and by the whole Church after him, on Concupiscence. Does not this shew, how strictly theo- logical is the discussion of its phenomena ? Yet what is such discussion, except a psychological analysis ?
How large a portion of Theology is constituted by this Higher Philosophy, one single consideration will sufficiently shew. St. Thomas's 4 Summa ' is a ' Summa Theologice : ' yet how large a portion of it is occupied, with matters which are within the region of Philo- sophy ? In the ' Pars Prima,' at least 35 questions out of 119; in the 'Prima Secundse,' at least 82 out of 114; in the ' Secunda Secundse,' not very far from 170 out of 189.* Again, ' Moral Theology,' as its name denotes, is part of ' Theology ; ' yet, in at least two- thirds of its extent, it is occupied with truths, which are in themselves within the province of Reason. See the remarks made in p. 151, 2 of this volume. See however p. 117, 8 and p. 149-151.
The whole of my present volume, it will be seen,
* Pars la q. 2-22, and 75-88. Prima Secundae, q. 1-66 ; 71-79 ; 90-97. I include q. 3 with its n. 8, because St. Thomas professes (though I venture to think most unsatisfactorily) to prove by Reason, that Beatitude must consist in the Vision of God's Essence. Secunda Secundee, q. 1-170. Since God's Existence is demonstrable by Reason, so also must be the larger part of those main doctrines, which relate to the three theological virtues.
b
XV111 PREFACE.
(with the most insignificant exception of four pages, 424-428) appertains to this part of Philosophy. The first Chapter purports to be 'on the Principles of * Morality ;' and the second, 'on Ethical Psychology :' while of the third Chapter, its first Section belongs to the latter, and its second to the former. It will be desirable then to add a few words, on the spirit of deference to the Church, with which every Catholic philosopher is bound to approach such subjects.
Undoubtedly, whatever part of Philosophy be in- vestigated by the Catholic, he owes implicit obedience to the voice of the Church. Whether he be studying the deep mysteries of Space and Time ; or the geological conformation of our planet ; or the planetary universe in general; — on all these subjects the Church possesses indirect authority. In all these investigations, she has the fullest right of peremptorily interfering, wherever she judges that any scientific conclusions lead to consequences, at variance with that doctrinal deposit which is committed to her keeping.* But such inter-
* Lord Macaulay indeed attributes to us a different doctrine. He is referring to the case of Galileo, and he makes this remark : ' All intelligent 1 Catholics now hold, with Pascal, that in deciding the point at all, the ' Church exceeded her powers, and was therefore justly left destitute of ' supernatural assistance.' (Review of Ranke.) I hope I am an ' intelligent Catholic' ; but I utterly repudiate any such position. I never indeed heard of any Catholic, ' intelligent ' or otherwise, who had given his atten- tion to the subject, holding any position of the kind. And if Lord Macaulay be right in thinking that Pascal did so, it is only necessary to reply, that where the question concerns due submission to the Church, Pascal is among the very last guides whom a well -instructed Catholic would wish to follow. In regard to the censure of Galileo, if his censured propositions had been most strictly and exclusively theological, it would have none the less been true, that the c?nsure was not of that character, which any theologian regards as claiming the Catholic's interior assent. It so happens, that proof can be adduced of this, which must satisfy the most eager opponent.
PREFACE. XIX
ferences are of course most rare ; nor are they founded, on any kind of authority which she possesses over secular science as such. They are founded on the obliga- tion under which she lies, of protecting her own science from invasion and detriment ; and on the privileges with which she has been invested by God, for the fulfilment of that obligation. Such are the limits of the Church's authority, within the sphere of purely secular science. But when we are handling such subjects as those with which the present volume is occupied, the case is most different. We are on the Church's special ground. We must look to her at every step for guidance : we must carefully direct our course by those landmarks, which she has so plentifully provided ; or some disastrous misadventure will result.
But it is impossible for me to speak in this way, without calling to mind the possibility, that this volume may come under the eye of Protestants. They will read such language as the above with so much indignation and impatience, that it seems de-
F. Faure, S. J. was one of the most eminent and learned theologians whom the last century produced. His eminence as an astronomer however was far from equalling his eminence as a theologian ; and he was most intensely opposed to the Copernican theory. Nay, he opposes Copernicanism on theological grounds ; and says that, if we once admit it, we have no defence left against Socinianism. ' Argumentati sumus,' he says, * neces- sariam esse illationem a Copernicanismo affirmato, ad amrmandum Socini- anismum' ; with very much more to the same purpose. (Notes on St. Augus- tine's Enchiridion, Passaglia's Edition, p. 49, col. 2.)
Now F. Faure is writing to Catholics ; and he holds that, even on theo- logical grounds, Copernicanism is a most pernicious and destructive error : it is quite certain therefore, that he will make every use in his power of any condemnation of Copernicanism, which the Church has ever pronounced. I would beg the reader then most carefully to observe the following language. * Quee omnia cum scribimus, scimus Socinianorum errorem . . . fuisse et esse ab Ecclesia damnatum ; quam damnationem adhuc non pasta est hypothesis
XX PREFACE.
sirable to say something on its manifest reasonableness. It is difficult, indeed, at all times to apprehend the precise ground of Protestant dissent from our doctrines. The deep and contemptuous prejudice with which (alas for themselves!) they regard our Creed, so possesses them, that they will not ordinarily take the trouble to analyse their objections, or put them into any definite shape. And so, in the matter before us, they deal in vague generalities; they say, e.g. that our maxims fetter the intellect, and enslave the soul : and they leave us to guess at the meaning of these gene- ralities as best we may.
Our own view of the case certainly seems on the surface simple and intelligible. All Truth is ordinarily a blessing ; but Truth, on those matters which directly concern virtue and piety, is among the very greatest blessings which we can receive. If then the Church is divinely commissioned to teach us such Truth, we are most grateful to God accordingly. We should no more imagine that this precious gift fetters the intellect and enslaves the soul, — than we should so think, if
Copernicana, sive ull& pontificia bulla sive ullo concilii cecumenici decreto. Ceeterum nos, non auctoritate (quae nulla nobis est) definientes, sed theo- logice ratiocinantes, argumentamur ab absurdo : quod argumentationis genus Catholic! ipsi Scholastic! contra Scholasticos alios usurpant, sine alterius injurid.' (p. 52, col. 1). F. Faure is evidently desirous that Copernicanism should be condemned, and thinks that it fully deserves condemnation ; yet he is obliged to confess that, at the moment of his writing, it is a perfectly open question.
Nor does this arise, from his forgetting the censures which had been put forth on Galileo ; for he distinctly mentions them immediately afterwards. He cites the ' decreta Congregationis Cardinalium sub Paulo V. die 5 Martii, 1616 ;' and also the 'censuratheologorum de mandato pontificis selectorum.' He cites these, at the head of his list of quotations ; quotations which are adduced to shew, how many and how strong Catholic authorities he
PREFACE. XXI
God mercifully revealed the efficacy of some medicine, which experience had not yet discovered; or than Adam so thought, when God instructed him how to till the earth and reap its fruits.
Such language then as the above seems most strangely chosen, if all which Protestants mean to ex- press is, that they are not themselves convinced, by those proofs which satisfy us of the Church's infallible authority. Such a difference is one of fact, not of principle ; and it seems quite unmeaning to express it in such phraseology as we have been considering. If however this be their whole meaning, of course it is impossible here to reply : because such a reply would simply be a discussion on the grounds on which the Church's claims repose ; and such a discussion would occupy a volume. Here it is only necessary to say, that a Protestant's authority on such a matter is, in general, worth extremely little ; for a Protestant, who knows with any kind of accuracy what we believe and why, is among the rarest of human beings.
But I cannot help thinking, that Protestants do often mean something more definite, when they use such
has on his side. But the idea never occurs to him of pressing them further ; of even starting the supposition, that they bind the Catholic's opinion to one side of the question.
I should add, that he speaks of ' Copernicani Catholici, si qui sunt qui systema illud, non tantuin ut hypothesin, defendunt ; in quo nulla esset difficultas.' This shews, I suppose, that not many Catholics in F. Faure's time held Copernican opinions ; so far at least as he was himself aware : but it shews much more clearly, that (in Faure's judgment) they might hold them, without ceasing to be Catholics ; or in other words (which indeed he had already expressly stated) that Copernicanism had never been condemned.
See, On the relations between Christianity and Scientific Investigation, an able essay of Father Newman's : ' On University Subjects,' p. 262.
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language. Some such statement as the following may perhaps correctly express their objection. ' Of course, ' where truth is to be received, which is above the 4 sphere of the intellect, an unquestioning acceptance of 4 God's Word is our only mode of arriving at it. But
* within the region of Philosophy, the intellect should 4 reign supreme and uncontrolled. Wherever any 4 matter is concerned, which the intellect can reach at « all, — its one way of reaching it is the way of free,
* unrestrained, unbiassed enquiry. To place any check ' upon such enquiry, is to fetter the intellect and enslave 4 the soul. Here is one strong reason, in addition to the 4 many others which will ever keep me back from 4 Catholicism ; viz. that it sanctions such tyrannical ' interference. I can never believe, that a revelation 4 from God goes counter to those intellectual laws, 4 which God Himself established in creating man/
This is undoubtedly a most intelligible objection ; and one which we can briefly notice in this place. I reply then most confidently, by denying the whole assumed principle. I deny altogether, that the intel- lect's appointed way of arriving at Truth, is that of unbiassed and uncontrolled inquiry. I assert the very contrary. I maintain, that so soon as the intellect quits the region of pure mathematics, it absolutely requires, for its healthy action, the being compelled constantly to compare its conclusions with some external standard. The vast majority even of speculative men, — or (to speak more truly) the whole body of them without exception, — have so constant a tendency to take up premisses, with no due regard to their truth and their sufficiency ; and to adopt reasoning with no due regard
PREFACE. XX111
to its validity ; that the human intellect will inevitably plunge more deeply into error at every step, unless some powerful corrective be applied to its spontaneous operations.
My first illustration of this statement shall be one, to which my opponents, least of all men, are likely to demur : the case of mediaeval physics. I am wholly ignorant myself, I regret to say, of the very rudiments of physical science : but there seems a consensus of all who have examined the subject, that the aberrations of physical science in the middle age were incredibly great ; and that those aberrations were all due to one cause. Enquirers of that age, we are told, had not learnt to check their conclusions at every step by ap- peal to experiment. Each speculator was consequently enabled, without restraint or hindrance, to follow his own preconceived ideas. The whole mass of physical error then, prevalent at that time, was owing to the one fact, that the intellect was left to its own intrinsic and spontaneous operations, without the necessity of con- forming its conclusions to some external standard.
Since the days of Bacon, it would seem, all this has been reformed. The great body of physical sciences seem to unite those two characteristics, which (when found together) constitute the surest proof, that a science has been duly constituted: I mean, stability and progressiveness. Each new generation of enquirers find fresh ground, for holding the great mass of Truth which they have received ; and at the same time have the means of importantly adding to that mass. Such are the advantages which flow, from the intellect being compelled to adjust its conclusions by an external standard.
XXIV PKEFACE.
But there is one science, if science it can indeed be called, which still reminds us of mediaeval physics. It is the Protestant attempt at constituting Morality and Theology. What is the popular account of ante- Baconian physics? Such as the following. We are told, that the treatment of physical matters, then pre- valent, was a disputatious, never-ending, still-beginning, strife of words. We are reminded, that the most in- genious series of deductions is useless, or worse than useless, where no pains is taken, to confront them with the external standard of actual experiment. We are informed, that after ten centuries so employed, — after the production of as many different theories as there have been speculators, each professing to exhaust the whole domain of physical science, and each irre- concileably at variance with all others, — the world will end just as wise as it began.
Such is the description popularly given of physical science, as it stood before the era of experiment. I earnestly wish my readers will peruse it again, and see in what respect it can be said to differ from Protestant Theology. In this also, each speculator has his own especial theory: each speculator professes to exhaust the whole domain of revealed science ; to give us his views, thought out by himself from the intimations of Scripture, on the Trinity, on Original Sin, on Eternal Punishment, on Justification by Faith. And what has been the result? The great test, as I just now observed, of a science being truly constituted, is the union of stability and progressiveness. As to the stability of Protestant Theology, it is but insulting Protestants to name the very notion : it is on its pro- gressiveness that they love to insist. Now what has
PREFACE. XXV
been its progressiveness ? Its progressiveness has consisted in its declension. Its course has been the gradual' subtraction of one doctrine after another ; until at length it seems culminating in the denial of all dogma whatever : I mean, of course, as dogma ; as being certainly revealed by God. The number of Protestants surely is becoming daily fewer, who will say of any doctrine, of any moral precept, ' this is a certain part of Christ's Revelation?' Things are more and more coming to this, that in no Protestant society is there any body of truths, accepted and recognised among its members as the truths of Revelation. And how are we to account for this state of things ? It arises from the fact, that the intellect has been left to work upon certain data, without being required to con- form its conclusions with some external standard, un- mistakeable in utterance and peremptory in authority. It has thus become a prey to its own waywardness and wilfulness.
Reverting however to physical science, — I will ask this question. Suppose some eminent philosopher is led by deduction to a certain result : he compares that result with phenomena, and finds it erroneous. Does it ever occur to him, that by this process his intellect is enslaved and his soul fettered ? On the contrary, he is most grateful for this opportunity of experimental disproof; he feels confident at once, that either his pre- misses have been unsound or insufficient, or his in- ferences too hasty. He reviews his past course of reasoning, fully assured that he will make one or other of these discoveries ; and his assurance is invariably justified by the event. Such is precisely the course
XXVI PREFACE.
adopted by a Catholic philosopher, in treating on such subjects as those of the present volume, if he find his conclusions at variance with the Church's voice. If such a procedure be the mark of intellectual slavery, then the votary of modern physical science is of all thinkers the most enslaved. But in fact every sober- minded man must regard it as an inappreciable advan- tage, that some guarantee should be afforded, against that one-sidedness, eccentricity, partiality, to which the unchecked intellect is ever exposed.
I need hardly add of course, that if our external standard were not infallibly correct, there would be intolerable bondage in being required to adjust by it our intellectual conclusions : and indeed unless we firmly believed it thus infallible, such a task would be simply impossible. I am not here at all professing to argue against those, who merely deny our allegation, that there is sufficient proof of the Church's infallibility. I have only been arguing against those who maintain, that there is some special objection to the very principle on which the Church proceeds ; the principle of re- quiring intellectual submission to an external standard, on matters which are within the province of Reason.
One final question will be asked. In regard to those philosophical truths which are within the domain of Theology, what is the distinction between their philo- sophical and their theological treatment? I think the two following particulars constitute the main distinction. (1.) The philosopher, as such, has no concern with any truth, except as demonstrable by Reason : wherever he has no proof from Reason to produce, the truths are out of his province. (2.) Although the Catholic philo-
PREFACE. XXV11
sopher is bound to take care, that his conclusions are fully in accordance with the pronouncements of sound Theology, — yet it is no part of his business to exhibit that accordance. The theologian, on the contrary, has no task more peculiarly his own, than to shew in every instance the accordance of those doctrines which he de- livers, with the decrees of the Church ; with Scripture ; with Tradition ; and with the other ' loci theologici.'
IT is now sufficiently apparent, what is meant by the * philosophical introduction ' to a c theological treatise.* It is the exhibition of those truths, as demonstrable by Reason, the mastery of which will enable us more fully to grasp the meaning or the evidence of the theological doctrines appertaining to that treatise. How far the propositions handled in the present Book have been well chosen for that end, it will be impossible of course for the reader to determine, till he has seen the subsequent volumes. But how far the said propositions are true, — and how far the argumentative support here given to them is adequate, — this is at once a most legitimate matter for criticism.
Of these propositions, by far the most important and fundamental, are those contained in the three first Sections. The second and third of these treat on the nature of Moral Truth ; and the first lays down a necessary foundation for such treatment. The idea 4 morally good,' — with its cognates ' morally preferable/ 4 morally evil,' — occurs at every step, through the whole science on * Nature and Grace/ So far as we apprehend these ideas obscurely, such obscurity will vitiate our apprehension of almost every single doctrine in the
XXV111 PREFACE.
science. The Church has not determined the precise character of this idea ; though of course it is most fully within her province to do so : but among the various theories which may be maintained by Catholics, I am most strongly convinced that the theory which I ad- vocate is, in all essential particulars, the theory which Reason declares.
No candid student indeed of Theology or Philo- sophy will deny, that in both these sciences there are many questions, even very important ones, of a more or less doubtful character. There are many questions, on which much may be urged with reason and soundness on both sides ; on which the investigation of Truth is a most anxious and delicate task ; and on which, even when we have decided that the balance inclines in one direction, we are obliged in fairness to admit, that various objec- tions and difficulties remained unsolved. We shall meet with many such questions in the succeeding volumes, and there are one or two of the same kind in the present. But I maintain confidently, that no such thing can truly be said on the matters handled in those two Sections. I maintain confidently, that while the reasons for that theory which I follow are cogent and irresistible, — there is neither difficulty nor objection, which possesses the slightest force on the opposite side. It will be for my reader of course to decide, — after having carefully studied the reasoning adduced, — how far that reason- ing warrants so confident a judgment. But I may refer them to the passage from p. 95 to p. 98, as con- taining an argument, which in itself (if it stood alone) seems to me quite decisive. And I may refer them to the passage from p. 102 to p. 107, as noticing that ob-
PREFACE. XXIX
•
jection, which, more than all others put together, deters some most pious and admirable Catholics from the con- clusion which I advocate.
• On this most important matter, as will be seen, I am utterly opposed to the opinion, that all moral obliga- tion is founded on the Creator's Command. Now I have found some Catholics under the impression, that this opinion rests on a degree of theological authority, which would make it at least temerarious in any Catholic to question it. There cannot be a greater miscon- ception than this ; I am confident indeed, that the great preponderance of authority is on my side. I have added therefore a Supplementary Section to shew this. This Section in no way professes a theological treatment of the question ; it is purely defensive, and directed against such adverse impressions as those to which I have just referred.
A considerable number of moral truths, in my humble opinion, are known to us intuitively. It was necessary therefore to prefix a preliminary Section, on the authority and self-evidence of various intuitive judgments. Moreover, some of the most current objec- tions, to that view of morality which I follow, are of such a nature, that if they were once admitted as of force, nothing could reasonably ensue, except the most absolute and hopeless scepticism. It was therefore essential, to enter in sufficient detail on this question of scepticism.
My immediate reason then for introducing a philoso- phical treatment of these two subjects, — viz. (1) the self-evidence of certain intuitions, and (2) the character of Moral Truth, — has been simply the indispensable ne-
XXX PREFACE.
*
cessity of such treatment for the purposes of our science. But if I had been specially thinking of contemporaneous non-Catholic philosophy, I could not have made a more pertinent selection. Thus (1) the main drift and cur- rent of such philosophy, as Dr. Brownson most justly remarks,* is towards a denial of Objective Truth. There is no refutation of this error, I think, so available, as that which shews the desolating extent to which such principles must consistently be carried, if they are worth any thing at all. This I have attempted to shew in my first Section. It will also be found (I think) that the philosophical principles advocated in that Sec- tion, if accepted as sound, add most importantly to the philosophical argument for God's existence. So much on the first Section. Then (2) the Objective Reality of moral distinctions, — the subject considered in the two following, — is perhaps equally important, in its bearing on the controversies of the time. If once admitted, it sweeps clean away that vague and misty Pantheism, which is at present so miserable a snare to the non- Catholic world. No human being has ever yet been found, who thoroughly holds the Objective Reality of moral distinctions, without going on further, to recognise a Personal God, the Moral Governor of mankind. f
* " Protestantism is not a religion ; is not a credo or a worship ; but is a suspense of faith ; a transition from the old superannuated Catholic form
to some newer and nobler form yet to be developed In former times
religion was regarded as having an Objective Truth, a subsistence independent of man ; and the question was, which and what is the true religion, if any ? But now it is not so. This order of thought denies all Absolute, and there- fore all Objective Truth, and makes both religion and truth purely relative and subjective. To refute it, we must establish the objectivity of thought itself; i.e. the Objective Truthfulness of Reason:'— Jan. 1860, pp. 22, 23.
t This has been most ably stated by Mr. Martineau ; a writer who
PREFACE. XXXI
A remonstrance of the following kind has reached me from one or two Catholics. 4 Surely,' they say, c all 1 Catholics are united in essentials, as regards the real * character of Moral Truth. No Catholic e.g. really 4 fancies, that God could command pride or malevo- 1 lence ; nor does any Catholic on the other hand hold, 4 that there is some abstract Moral Rule, distinct from ' and independent of Himself. Catholics differ on such ' points, rather in their expressions than in their thoughts ; 4 and it is undesirable to dwell on such points of differ- ' ence, when we should rather aim at presenting an 4 united front.'
There are many replies, which I could make to this: I will content myself with two. The question here to be considered, it will be seen, is not whether those views be correct which I myself maintain on Moral Truth, but whether it be of any great importance to have correct views. And I most gladly concur with the objector in thinking, that on such matters
expresses himself, not only with so much depth and clearness of thought, but in many respects with such deep recognition of piety and religion, that it is most painful to think, how many of his opinions must be regarded by every Catholic, as not erroneous merely, but deeply pernicious. These are his words on the matter in hand : —
" No ethical conceptions are possible at all, except as floating shreds of unattached thought, without a religious background ; and the sense of responsibility, the agony of shame, the inner reverence for justice, first find their meaning and vindication in a Supreme Holiness that rules the world. Nor can any one be penetrated with the distinction between right and wrong, without recognising it as valid for all free beings, and incapable of local or arbitrary change. His feeling insists on its permanent recognition and omnipresent sway ; and this unity in the Moral Law carries him to the Unity of the Divine Legislator. Theism is thus the indispensable postulate of conscience ; its objective counterpart and justification, without which its inspirations would be illusions and its veracities themselves a lie." Studies of Christianity, p. 9. See also p. 75 of this volume, and the passage of F. Newman there referred to.
XXX11 PREFACE.
Catholics differ, not so much in principle, as in their respective mode of analysing those principles which they hold in common. Yet it is of very great moment, in regard to a most extensive part of theological science, that the student should have clear views on the terms ' right ' and ' wrong ; ' and the same thing is extremely important on other grounds also. But where prin- ciples are the same, to hold clear views, is to hold correct views : if an incorrect view be consistent with sound principle on the subject, it must be precisely because such view is obscure. This is my first re- ply; and I proceed to a second. It is of extreme moment, that the Objective Eeality of moral distinctions should be urged on various non-Catholic philosophers. Now we can only urge this truth on them, by means of argument; and argument is not available for an incor- rect statement of the truth, but only for a correct one. On both these grounds therefore it is in the highest degree desirable, that we Catholics shall come to agree> what that correct statement really is.
There are some peculiarities of arrangement in the present volume, which make it necessary to offer some further explanation, in regard to the three first Sections.
No one can be surprised, that I feel most deeply the anxious and momentous character of the work which I have undertaken, and. the great danger of falling into serious mistakes in its accomplishment. I felt it very desirable therefore, before publishing this volume, that I should obtain the judgment of theological friends on its contents. Accordingly, I circulated it privately so long ago as last October ; and I have been so fortunate as to receive numerous
PREFACE. XXxili
and valuable comments on its many defects. The course of reflection into which these comments led me, determined me wholly to re-write the three first Sections. It did not appear to me that in other portions any alteration was absolutely indispensable. But there is no part of the volume, in which it is so important to convey my meaning clearly and con- vincingly, as in these first Sections ; and there was no part in which I had made less approach towards attain- ing that desirable object.
This failure arose in part, from my having attempted to combine two incompatible ends. It is not difficult, and I never found it so, in dealing with students who have received no special philosophical instruction,* to place before them (what I consider) the true principles on Certitude and on Morality, with amply sufficient clearness ; with so much clearness, as should enable them, both to understand those principles, and to appreciate their argumentative foundation. Nor, on the other hand, can I admit that it is at all difficult to place the same principles, with the same clearness, before those who have given considerable attention to Philosophy : for the unquestionable truth of these principles (according to my view of the case) makes the task a comparatively easy one. But to combine these two ends, (is I believe) not difficult, but impossible. Yet in this volume, as it first issued from the press, I did attempt to combine them. The consequence was, as might have been expected, that the three Sections were too lengthy and obscure to be apprehended by
* At St. Edmund's I was allowed to give some instructions to those who were just beginning their philosophical studies.
XXXI V PREFACE.
Beginners ; while they were too brief and hurried, to give time for meeting fairly the difficulties and ob- jections which occur to those versed in Philosophy. Indeed, in the very construction of the volume there was ample proof, how little my plan had been matured. For when first I began writing, I had intended to omit all direct treatment of that most important question, the relation between God and Necessary Truth. As I proceeded, I found more and more the impractic- ableness of such omission ; and at last I had to add an Appendix, for the purpose of explaining what I ought to have stated at first.
This was, in part, the reason why these Sections, in their original state, were obscure without being profound, and lengthy without being full. Another reason was my culpable inattention (here and there) to strict accuracy of statement. The strongest instance of this is referred to in p. 30 with the appended note. The theory there mentioned, and which many attributed to me, had never so much as occurred to my imagi- nation; yet I could not deny, when my attention was called to it, that there were various passages which, considered apart from the general context, gave much support to this interpretation of my meaning.
I have consequently re-written the three first Sec- tions ; keeping no other end in view, except to present my arguments in the clearest possible shape, before those who are conversant with philosophical inquiries. It should be distinctly understood however, that I have not made any change whatever in the philosophical principles which I have advocated, or even in the slightest detail or particular of philosophical opinion :
PREFACE. XXXV
as any one may readily see, who will read the Sections as they originally stood. It is necessary to make this explanation, quite apart from any vindication of personal consistency, for the interests of what I regard as truth. I could not expect the view, which I advocate, to be considered with any care or attention, if it were supposed to be a theory newly adopted; at variance with one formerly held ; and merely taken up, under pressure of adverse argument. But nothing could be more contrary to the fact than any such supposition. Indeed the various comments, which I have received on the three Sections, would have greatly increased and intensified my conviction of their substantial truth, if that conviction had not already been so strong, as to be incapable of increase from any further argumentative confirmation.
I have greatly increased then the length of the first Sections, and have incorporated into them what stood as the Appendix. In order to make room for these additions, I have moved — to the end of the volume — that Section which stood fourth in order, giving it the title ' Supplementary Section/ Even after doing this, two or three pages, and two or three numbers, will be found twice over : I have therefore marked them with an asterisk, where they occur in the third Section. Finally I have added a brief paper of ' Cor- rigenda ;' chiefly for the purpose of correcting refer- ences, made in the later Sections, to the first three Sections as they originally stood.
ON the rest of the volume, considered in detail, very few preliminary remarks seem required. In the re-
XXX VI PREFACE.
maining Sections of the first Chapter, I have pursued on grounds of Reason, these three enquiries. (1) What is the appropriate means, whereby Reason, were it left to work by itself, might arrive at Moral Truth? (2) How far does Moral Truth extend over the various acts of us men, in the nature and circumstances which God has appointed to us ? (3) What is the full power pos- sessed by God of working a change in Moral Truth ? The precise relation between God and Moral Truth cannot possibly be understood, till this last point has been carefully considered ; and the seventh Section is consequently devoted to its investigation.
The various matters, treated in the second Chapter under the head of c Ethical Psychology,' are such, that the reader will at once see their importance, in the way of preparation for that portion of Theology which we undertake. I may however beg him specially to notice the distinction between 'implicit' or 'virtual' and merely 4 habitual ' intention, because of the extremely important practical consequences which result from that distinction. See p. 233-238 and p. 246-248.*
* One of these consequences is so incalculably important, in its bearing on the spiritual life of every single day, that I will here state it. It will have no natural place in the body of this treatise till we come to the third Book ; but what here follows will be readily intelligible, to any one who has read carefully the above- cited pages. It is taken almost word for word, from one of the lectures which I gave at St. Edmund's.
Men unversed in Theology, I remarked to my pupils, sometimes speak, as though a merely habitual intention could make a present action good, which would otherwise not be so. They will tell you, e. g. that if in the morning I refer all my acts of the day to God, this makes every act of the day, which would be otherwise indifferent, individually good. Yet it is hardly credible that men, not absolutely bereft of reason, should gravely put forth such an absurdity as is here stated. Of course, if the morning reference have left a trace of itself behind ; — if, as a consequence of that reference, I am in fact at this moment really (though unconsciously) refer-
PREFACE. XXX Vll
Again, it may be worth while to mention here, that the discussions of the third Section in this second Chapter lands us at the very threshold of the whole theological doctrine of concupiscence. There could follow immediately afterwards (1) an explanation and definition of the term 'concupiscence;' (2) a detailed consideration of the phenomena which that term ex- presses ; and (3) a treatment of those very important passages, wherein St. Paul refers to these phenomena.
I would also direct particular attention to the long fifth Section, ' On the Adaptation of our Nature to Virtue.' This Section is almost entirely independent of what precedes and follows, and its reasoning is far more easy of apprehension, than are the various arguments of the first Chapter. It is possible therefore, that various readers, who may not care to take the pains of mastering that earlier Chapter, may yet be not unwilling to study this particular part of the volume. The proposition on which I lay far the greatest stress is this ; that there is no one propension, implanted by God in our nature, which is not capable of legitimate gratification in the
ring my acts to a good end ; — then our very statement is, that my acts (if otherwise faultless) are truly good. Here is a real case of * implicit * or ' virtual ' intention. But we are now speaking of the case, when the morn- ing reference has not left behind it any trace, which at this moment exists. And to say that, in such a case, that past reference makes the present act good, is among the most extravagantly absurd of all imaginable proposi- tions.
We shall in due time have to consider one of Luther's strangest heresies ; it is this, that so only we have what he calls faith, (i.e. unbounded confidence in the certainty of our own salvation), our acts, though remaining bad, are counted by God as if they were good, and are requited accordingly. A monstrous statement, indeed ! but yet one which is immeasurably less absurd, than that which I am now assailing. For my present opponent does not say that, in consequence of my morning's reference, my present act is counted by God as though it were good ; but that it actually is good~
XXXV111 PKEFACE.
cause of virtue, see p. 259-359. It is evident at once, how vitally momentous is this proposition, (if once it be admitted as true,) on the whole theory of spiritual guidance and direction. It is also evident at once how important a corroboration it will furnish, to the argu- ment for that all-important truth, the Creator's Sanctity, Were it only on these grounds, I hope that my readers will carefully examine the course of reasoning on which it is supported. But my chief reason for laying so much stress on it has been the following.
There is one miserable habit, against which it seems to me that we have especially to be on our guard, in the present age : — the habit of worldliness. By this I mean, the not practically regarding it as any part of our ordinary Christian duty, to labour
He absolutely says, incredible as tke fact must appear, that an act is consti- tuted good, from a circumstance which in no way affects it ; from a circum- stance which is done and over, leaving no trace behind. 'Yesterday afternoon,' e.g. ' I elicited a certain act ; this present afternoon I elicit another, which ' is precisely similar to yesterday's in every single circumstance without ' exception. Yet the act of yesterday afternoon is good and the act of this ' present afternoon is bad, — because yesterday morning I made a reference of my day's acts to God, and this morning I did not.' Intellectual drivel- ling can hardly sink below this ; it is like saying that my evening cup of tea is sweet, because I put a lump of sugar into the cup which I drank at breakfast. Lugo gives expression to this common-sense principle, by taking the particular case of temperance at meals. You and I are both at dinner : our will is affected (we will suppose) in precisely the same way towards the delicacies before us ; and our external acts also are precisely similar. Yet it shall be judged forsooth that I am acting at this moment rightly and you wrongly, — or (in other words) that I am eating temperately and you zratemperately, — because in the morning I referred my dinner to God, and you did not. Of course, that shews that in the morning I acted (so far) better than you ; that I at least elicited one good act which you did not. But how upon earth can this circumstance affect the present act, unless it does affect the present act ? I mean, if the action of my will at this moment is not intrinsecally affected by my morning's reference, how can the moral quality of that action be affected by such reference 1 ( Certum
PREFACE. XXXIX
directly and systematically at the task, of raising our affections from earthly to heavenly objects.* In the third and fourth Books I shall have again and again to revert upon this. I shall have to shew my grounds for believing that this danger now very specially exists ; the causes which (in my humble judgment) lead to it ; deplorable and degraded state of mind which worldliness engenders, and which is the more deplorable, because its true character is so commonly unsuspected ; lastly, our appropriate safeguards against it. I need hardly say that, among those safeguards, theological study itself has a very prominent place, for those who have the means of pursuing such study ; because the great end to be aimed at for the purpose of protection, is the obtaining an intimate and familiar acquaintance with the great Objects of Faith. But, not here to dwell upon
mihi est,' says Lugo, 'hanc voluntatem merd habitualem non sufficere ad meritum . . . operis sequentis. . . Quare qui mane refert omnes suas actiones ad Deum, si postea pransurus itd se hdbet ac si earn voluntatem non habuisset, nee comestio oritur ex ed voluntate nee ab alia bona et honesta, non magis meretur per comestionem, qudm si earn voluntatem non habuisset.'' (De Pceni- tentia, d. 7, n. 39.)
In a word, then, I cannot now be eliciting a good act of any kind, unless my will be now influenced by a good motive : unconsciously perhaps, but really and truly ; I may not see it, but God sees it. I am not now eliciting an act of justice, because I elicited one in the morning ; my will must now be fixed on the virtuousness of justice. I am not eliciting an act of tem- perance now, when my meal is over and I am engaged very freely in talking and laughing, — because I ate my meal temperately when I was eating it. And in like manner, if I wish at this moment to have the advantage of referring my acts to God, I must be referring them to Him at this moment ; not perhaps consciously, but really, practically, influentially. It does not. make my present act good, that I elicited a very good act in the morning.
Among innumerable testimonies to this principle, I drew their particular attention to F. Rigolieuc's beautiful treatise ' De la Garde du Cceur.'
* See Father Faber's most powerful chapter on 'the World,' in the 'Creator and the Creature.' That chapter is, I think, among the most masterly things he has ever done.
X.1 PKEFACE.
tliis, it is plain that one most powerful help will be ob- tained for deliverance from worldliness, in proportion as men are practically impressed with the conclusion, to which this fifth Section is mainly directed. It is plain, I say, that men will be immeasurably more en- couraged to labour at fixing their hearts on the Invisible World, in proportion as they come to the conviction, that all their deepest emotions, all their keenest af- fections, may thus receive satisfaction, both far more intense and far more permanent, than the wretched objects of this perishable world can possibly afford.
In regard to the third Chapter, it must be manifest to any one reading it, how completely the two questions, there discussed, constitute an integral part of our science.
And in regard to the short fourth Chapter, its- indispensable necessity, for our subsequent theological reasoning, will be thoroughly recognised by all who may read the following volumes. The doctrine of Liberty e.g., and again the unavoidableness of venial sin, are perfectly unintelligible without such a pre- paration.
HAVING now said all that seems necessary on the general contents of the volume, I will close this Preface with a few miscellaneous remarks.
It will be observed, that I have introduced a large number of quotations from Father Newman ; and chiefly, though not exclusively, from his Protestant works. I have had two reasons for doing this. In the first place, I was desirous that Catholic readers should know, how large a fund of deep Christian Philosophy
PREFACE. xll
is contained in F. Newman's Protestant works. And those who may be struck by the specimens which I bring before them, will not improbably be led to consult the originals.
But there was another much stronger reason. I hope it may not be considered egotistical, if I speak on the intellectual relation in which I stood for many years to F. Newman. Certainly it ought, not so to be considered ; for such relation was in no way peculiar to myself: on the contrary, very great numbers of us converts would have substantially the same testimony to give, though with accidental differences, according to the circumstances of each individual case. What I have to state, then, is this, I was enmeshed in the toils of a false philosophy, which could have had no other legitimate issue, except a further and further descent towards the gulf of utter infidelity. From this thraldom, the one human agency which effected my deliverance was F. Newman's teaching. My deliverance was wrought, not merely through the truth and depth (as I consider) of those philosophical principles which he inculcated ; but also through the singular large- mindedness, whereby he was able to make those principles both intelligible and attractive to every variety of character. In regard, then, to those citations which I make from his Protestant works, I wish to ex- plain the meaning of my adducing them. I do not quote them, as external testimonies for this or that truth, to which my own reflection had brought me ; every one of them had its place, in opening that truth itself on my apprehension. Take any one of F. Newman's utterances in his Protestant works on the one hand;
Xlii PREFACE.
and take any one of my own convictions on moral and religious matters on the other hand ; it is often im- possible for me even to guess, how far the former may have been simply the one exciting cause of the latter.
I am saying this, simply to explain the meaning of my references to so great a benefactor : not in any way, as though I claimed his authority, in approval of what I have now written. I might, in my present circum- stances, venture to differ from him, even on very important matters of thought on which Catholics are allowed to differ ; and yet I must not, on that account, appear to forget, that to him, as to the one human cause, I owe the inestimable blessing of having become a Catholic at all.
The mention of one individual leads me not un- naturally to speak of other individuals. I have criti- cised, in my first Section, Mr. Mansel and Mr. Mill, as representing in different ways what I have called the semi-sceptical position in Philosophy. To each of these gentlemen accordingly I forwarded, half a year ago, the volume as it then stood.
I have to thank Mr. Mansel sincerely, for his kind reception of it, and for the frank explanation which he was so good as to send me on the matter between us. My own statement of the point at issue, in the volume as it then stood, was far from clear ; and it is probable enough that, had the case been otherwise, a greater amount of agreement would have resulted, from our mutual communication. However that may be, I am still (quite as strongly as before) under the impression, that Mr. Mansel and I are at direct issue on the matter referred to ; nor can I honestly speak, as though I con-
PREFACE. Xliii
sidered this matter to be one of subordinate importance. See p. 20-25. But in expressing very earnest dissent from what I understand to be Mr. Hansel's proposition, I trust that neither my words nor my tone are in any way inconsistent with most sincere respect. Such respect is certainly Mr. MansePs due, for the great services which he has rendered in many ways to the cause of sound Philosophy.
In regard to Mr. Stuart Mill, I can only say that he could not have treated me with greater kindness or courtesy, had he concurred with the main substance of my volume, instead of differing (as I fear is the case) on almost every premiss, and almost every conclusion. His comments have enabled me, I hope, to bring out my side of the controversy with greater distinctness and precision ; and they have confirmed me in the impression which I have long entertained, of his intellectual character. Of Mr. Mill certainly, if of any man living, it may truly be said, that he aims at doing the fullest justice to every school of thought, however remote from his own ; and that the one aim, which consciously influences his intellectual exertions, is the pursuit of truth. May the Merciful God grant him, before he dies, the unspeakable blessing of its pos- session !
Reverting to the general contents of the volume, I should observe that I have retained the form of Lectures throughout, and have addressed my various remarks to an imaginary audience of pupils. One chief reason for this, has been my desire of thereby rendering my style less dull and heavy than it naturally is. The same desire has led me, in various places, to be much more
PREFACE.
frequent in the use of Italics, than is (I fear) really conducive to the very purpose at which I aimed.
I have already spoken of my anxiety, in regard to the work which I have undertaken. I should have felt this, in undertaking any theological treatise. But surely there is no part of Theology, in which it is so easy to fall into serious mistakes, — in which it is so difficult to preserve faithfully the true mean, — as in that, with which my succeeding volumes are to be occupied. Let one important instance of this be con- sidered, as a sample of several. On the one hand there is the danger, lest theological doctrine should be so represented, as unduly to alarm those, who sincerely desire and pray for their own sanctification ; but who are conscious of indefinite weakness and inconsistency. On the other hand there is the danger, lest any thing should be even accidentally stated, which might con- firm in their blind and presumptuous confidence those most misguided men, who have no practical fear in regard to their eternal lot, while yet they are making no efforts at all to discover their latent faults ; to remove their affections from objects of this earth ; to measure worldly events by the Divine standard ; to grow in personal love of their God and Saviour. One hardly knows, which of these two extremes is the more mischievous and dangerous ; and it is most difficult, consistently to avoid giving some countenance to one or to the other.
Such being my dread of the task before me, I might well have shrunk from attempting it. And certainly indeed I should have so shrunk, had not circumstances of various kinds led me strongly to think, that it is a
PREFACE. xlv
work which God desires at my hands. In this opinion I have been confirmed, by more than one clerical friend, thoroughly conversant with the state of the case, and on whose judgment I have the greatest reliance.
I have only therefore earnestly to pray for God's Merciful Guidance ; and to submit most unreservedly each volume, as it appears, to the Church's judgment. In this very Preface I have strongly urged, that nearly all the subjects, treated in this volume, fall most directly and absolutely under the Church's jurisdiction. If then there be any proposition in them which the Church may think fit to censure, — God forbid there should be any such ! — I am certain beforehand, that such state- ment is no less contrary to Reason than to Theology ; and at this moment I implicitly (implicite) revoke and renounce it.
It is abundantly possible again, that there may be various views, here contained, which, though not incurring the Church's censure, may be mistaken in themselves and injurious in their tendency. May God grant that any such views may be speedily and efficaciously refuted ! If on the other hand (as I earnestly hope is the case) there are other propositions which are true and sound, may He bless them to the one ultimate end which every theologian must propose for his labours, — the sanctification and salvation of souls !
Northwood Park, Cowes, Feast of St. Joseph's Patronage, April 29, 1860.
TABLE OF CONTENTS TO BOOK I.
CHAPTER I.
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY.
SECTION I. On Intuitions and on the Principle of Certitude.
PAOB
1. Judgments of Consciousness and Judgments of Intuition. . 5
2. Judgments of unconscious Inference. .... 7
3. The principle of Philosophical Scepticism stated. . . 9
4. The Sceptic's answer to a Semi-sceptic 10
5. Consistently to hold Sceptical opinions, is physically im-
possible. 14
6. Semi-scepticism is an utterly unreasonable and inconsistent
position. .... ^>^ .... 15
7. Scepticism need not in consistency extend to Judgments
of Consciousness. . . . . . . .16
8. Scepticism a worse extreme even than Rationalism. . ib.
9. The Principle of Certitude stated and defended. . . 18
10. The Principle of Certitude has been denied by Mr. Man-
sel, though partially and inconsistently. . . .19
11. Also by Mr. Stuart Mill and his school. ... 25
12. Intuitional light the reasonable ground, for our confidently
holding certain intuitive judgments. ... 29
13. Fundamental importance of laying down some test of legi-
timate intuitions. ....... 33
14. Two explanatory and qualifying statements on this. . 34
15. F. Burner's tests of legitimate intuitions. ... 37
16. A thesis may be most fully founded on reason, yet not on
reasoning. ......... 38
17. Remarks on the sense in which we throughout used the
word * intuition,' and other kindred terms. . . 39
18. On necessary intuems 42
19. On the relation between God and Necessary Truth. . ib.
20. Concluding remark on the Section. . " . . .47
Xlviii CONTENTS.
SECTION II. On the Essential Characteristics of Moral Truth.
PAGE
21. Various judgments stated, which include in different shapes
the idea * morally good.' ...... 48
22. What is meant by simple and complex ideas ? 50
23. What is meant by analytical and synthetical judgments ?
Various subdivisions of the former. .... 52
24. The idea ' morally evil ' is maintained to be a l simple
idea.' 55
25. Reply to that attempted analysis, which would explain it
as meaning ' worthy of disapprobation ; ' or ' worthy of blame ; ' or ' worthy of punishment.' ... 56
26. Reply to that attempted analysis, which would explain it
as meaning ' prohibited by the Creator.' ... 57
27. The same reasoning equally efficacious, against any other
attempted analysis. . . . . . . .61
28. That particular moral judgment, which we originally cited,
is intuitive and not inferential. .... 63
29. It is a legitimate intuition. ...... 64
30. The truth intued is a necessary truth. .... 67
31. Explanation of the term < Moral Truth.' ... 68
32. Remarks on the two classes of philosophers, who are op-
posed to our doctrine. ...... 69
SECTION III. On the Relation between God and Moral Truth.
33. Subject of the ensuing Section. ..... 71
34. Relation between God and Moral Truth, according to our
doctrine. 72
35. Two positions, on which all Catholic philosophers, who
differ from our doctrine, would agree with each other. 76
36. First adverse theory considered. 'Morally evil means
freely prohibited by the Creator.' .... 77
37. Second adverse theory. ' Morally evil means necessarily
prohibited by the Creator.' ..... 78
38. Third adverse theory. 'Morally evil means necessarily
detested by the Creator.' 90
39. Fourth adverse theory. ' Morally evil means necessarily
detested by the One Necessary Being.' ... 93
40. Fifth adverse theory. * Morally evil means that which
separates us from our True End.' .... ib.
41. General argument against all these adverse theories. . 95
42. Can we say that Veracity and Benevolence are Perfections,
because God is what He is ? . ... 98
CONTENTS. xlix
PAGE
43. First objection considered. * You exalt an abstraction
above the Living God/ . . , . . .100
44. Second objection considered. * A creator who should love
mendacity and cruelty, would give us faculties which regard those qualities as virtuous.' . . '•' . . 101
45. Third objection considered. ' Every obligation is con-
sidered by holy men as coming from God, and as part
of His free Providence.' ...... 102
46. Various modes in which our doctrine holds up God as the
One Object of undivided reverence. . . . 107
47. Distinction between « Dei Potentia Absoluta' and ' Ordinata.' 1 09 48*The Natural Rule and the Natural Law. . . .111 49*' Mala quia Prohibita,' and * Prohibita quia mala.' . . 107* 50*The truths of these Sections in their ontological order. . 108* 51*Conclusion of the Section. . 110*
SECTION V. On the Idea of Moral Worthiness.
48. Instances in which men always say, that this act is more
worthy than that. . . . . . . .113
49. The idea 'moral worthiness' a simple idea. . . .114
50. Its connection with the idea of moral obligation. . .115
51. Extreme frequency of moral judgments. . . . .116
52. Enlarged sense of the phrase * Natural Rule.' . . .117
53. Different senses in which it may be asked, how far the
Natural Rule extends. . :=i*fc*-: .... ib.
SECTION VI. On the Extent of the Natural Rule.
54. Justice, Veracity, and Benevolence, are intrinsecally good
ends of action. . . . . . .119
55. No good end of action may ever be contravened, except
for the sake of some other good end, which at the moment conflicts with it. . . . . .122
56. No act is virtuous, unless done for the virtuousness of
some good end. .. . . .. . . . ib.
57. Distinction between objective and subjective virtuousness. 124
58. An act is subjectively better, caeteris paribus, in propor-
tion as the will adheres more firmly and efficaciously
to the virtuousness of a good end 125
59. What is meant by an Infinitely Holy Being ? . . ib.
60. Objection made against the proposition, that a Holy
Creator cannot deceive us ; and reply to that objec- tion. ... . . * . . ,• . * . 126
d
1 CONTENTS.
PAGF
61. Virtuousness of those good acts which relate to God. . 127
62. How far will Reason shew, that Humility, Forgivingness,
and Purity, are virtuous ends of action ? . . .128
63. ' Production of the arc' principle. . . . ib.
64. The Moral Faculty 129
65. Process whereby our moral judgments increase in ac-
curacy. . . . . . . . .132
66. Position occupied respectively, by the Moral Faculty and
by the other intellectual faculties, in arriving at moral truth. ... 135
67. The question, 'What are virtuous ends of action? 'is
immeasurably more important than any other moral question. . . . . . . . .138
68. Reason shews that pride is sinful. . . . . .139
69. Reason shews that vindictiveness is sinful. . . .144
70. What are the various grounds, which justify infliction of
pain on our fellow-men? . . . . . .146
71. Is Forgivingness simply identical with Benevolence? . 147
72. Reason shews the virtuousness of Purity. . . . 148
73. Catalogue of virtuous ends recognised by Reason. . .149
74. Probable inference, from all that has been said, on the
Extent of the Natural Rule ; and harmony of this inference with the dicta of theologians. . . .150
75. Objection to our whole doctrine answered. . . .152
76. Our principles add to the motives of credibility for Catho-
licism. ......... 153
77. Reasons for holding our doctrine, on the Moral Faculty
and its growth. . . . . . . .154
78. Substantial agreement of the principles put forth in this
Section, with those usually recognised by Catholics. 161
SECTION VII. On God's Power of Interference with the Natural Rule.
79. Interference is of two kinds. . . . . . .165
80. God's Power of addition to the Natural Rule. . . ib.
81. God's Power of subtraction from the Natural Rule. . 166
82. Mutable part of the Natural Law 170
83. Immutable part of the Natural Law. . . . .171
84. Theologians cited in behalf of our doctrine. . . .175
85. How far can God, by His interference, affect the relative
moral worthiness of acts ? . . . . 187
86. Distinction between * intrinsic' and 'independent' obliga-
tion or moral worthiness. . . . . .188
87. Concluding remarks, on the matters treated in this whole
Chapter. % . . 190
CONTENTS.
li
PACK
CHAPTER II.
ON ETHICAL PSYCHOLOGY.
88. Explanation of the term. ... .192
SECTION I. On the Threefold Classification of Mental Phenomena.
89. The soul is a simple substance. ... .195
90. We have no direct knowledge of that substance itself. . ib.
91. Its phenomena fall irresistibly under three classes. . . 196
92. Emotions in general .197
93. Propensions, and an important division of them. . . ib.
SECTION II. On tjie Passions.
94. Explanation of the term 200
95. First six Passions enumerated by the scholastics. . .201
96. Supplementary remarks on these. ..... 202
97. Remaining five Passions enumerated by the scholastics. . 205
98. Criticism on this latter enumeration. .... 207
99. Proposed enumeration of the Passions. .... 209
SECTION III. On the Relation between Will and Sensitive Appetite.
100. Act of Will, corresponding respectively to each Passion. 211
101. Name given to each act of Will 212
102. * Spes,' 'audacia,' 'delectatio voluntatis,' considered and
analyzed. Also 'envy' and ' ill-humour' of the Will,
and 'murmuring against God's Providence.' . . 213
103. 'Gaudium Voluntatis' and 'Delectatio Morosa.' . . 217
104. Acts of the Will are often elicited, without any correspond-
ing emotions. Caution with which this statement is
to be received. , . . . , . 220
105. ' Motus primo-primi' and ' secundb-primi.' . , . 222
106. 'Actus primo-primi' and ' secundo-primi.' . . 224
107. Power of the Will in resisting emotion. .... ib.
Hi CONTENTS.
SECTION IY. On Certain other Phenomena of the Will.
PAGE
108. Subject of the Section 231
109. < In tentio finis.' ib.
110. 'Absolute end ;' 'Relative or intermediate ends.' . . 232
111. ' Unconscious intention,' either ' implicit ' or ' virtual.' . 233
112. A considerable number of actual ends are often simul-
taneously influential. ...... 235
113. ' In tentio finis ' is applied to a relative end, no less than to
an absolute. ........ 236
114. ' Habitual Intention.' Subdivision of this. , . . ib.
115. 'Intentio,' distinguished from 'Amor' and ' Desiderium.' 238
116. Acts of the Will are what they are, and not what we
reflect on them as being. ...... 239
117. < Bonum' defined 242
118. ' Bonum delectabile.' 243
119. ' Bonum honestum.' ....... 244
120. Unconscious intention of bonum honestum. . . . 246
121. No other 'bonum,' except 'honestum,' 'delectabile,' and
' utile.' • 248
SECTION V. On the Adaptation of our Nature to Virtue.
123. Subject of the Section 250
124. First argument for our thesis. Virtue is pursued for its
own sake, but vice cannot possibly be so pursued. . ib.
125. Second argument for our thesis. ' Bonum honestum ' and
'delectabile,' as they are the only legitimate, so are
the only possible, ends of action. .... 251
126. Third argument. Moral judgments are so extremely
frequent with all men. . . . . . .251
127. Fourth argument. The pleasures of reflection are all on
the side of virtue. ....... ib.
128. Fifth argument stated. Our Propensions are the sole
occasion of sin; and yet there is not one of them, which has not a real and legitimate place in leading us to virtue. ........ 252
129. Most important place held by pleasure, in helping us to-
wards virtue. ........ 254
130. Immense benefits of sensible devotion. .... 257
131. Individual propensions examined. Propension of Duty . 259
CONTENTS. liii
PAGE
132. Propension of Self- Charity. . . . 260
133. Propension of Personal Love 261
134. The passion 'Amor,' distinguished both from 'Amor
Benevolentiae,' and ' Amor Concupiscentiae.' . . 265
135. Singular assistance given by this Propension, to growth in
love of God. . 266
136. Propension of General Love for mankind. . . . 274
137. Propension of Compassion. ...... 276
138. Propension of Gratitude. . ... 278
139. State of the argument considered. . . . . ib.
140. Love of Honour considered. ...... 279
141. Love of Power 283
142. Love of Money 284
143. Love of Intellectual Exertion 289
144. Resentment 297
145. Love of the Marvellous. . . .... 311
146. Objection to the statements ofn. 144, answered by help
of this latter Propension. . ..... 312
147. Emulation perverted into Envy. . . . . .314
148. Love of Self-assertion perverted into Pride. . . .315
149. List of the Propensions already enumerated. . . . 324
150. What are those Propensions respectively useful for our
duties, (1) towards the Invisible World ; (2) towards
our own interior; and (3) towards our fellow-men ? . 325
151. Protestants, in proportion as they are 'formally' such,
practically deny, that God can be a satisfying Object to our higher Propensions. This view stated and examined. ........ 329
149.* As men grow in perfection, it is not that new Propensions spring up within them, but that the Propensions, implanted by God in their nature, are fixed on new
Objects 347
150.* On the Bodily Propensions 350
151.* On the Love of Beauty 355
152. Sixth argument for our Thesis. The ex-regarding Pro-
pensions are fully as powerful as the self-regarding. . 359
153. Seventh argument. Peace obtained, by the rest of our
most powerful and pervasive Propensions, in the thought of God 361
154. How far are virtue and earthly happiness ordinarily co-
incident? 363
155. How far does our earthly happiness consist, in our
prospect of Future Bliss ? 373
156. Eighth argument for our Thesis. None of our most power-
ful and pervasive Propensions can possibly come into closer contact with earthly objects, than they may with heavenly ........ 376
By some mistake nn. 149-151 have been repeated.
Hv CONTENTS.
SECTION VI.
On the Marks of Moral Degradation in our Nature as it now exists.
PAGE
157. Existence of evil an utterly insoluble difficulty. • 381
158. Testified by experience. ...... ib.
159. The difficulty has not been lessened by Revelation. . . 383
160. Our nature, as it now exists, is far more powerful in the
wrong, than in the right, direction. .... 384
161. Our Will is far weaker in its aim at virtue, than at
pleasure. 385
162. Our Will is most wayward and capricious, in its aim at
virtue 387
163. The Propension of the Flesh seems to have received a
most morbid intensity. ...... 389
164. Connection of this with the dogma of Original Sin. . 390
SECTION VII.
On Certain Philosophical Terms.
165. On the term c Nature,' as applied to an individual. . . 392
166. On the term * Nature,' as applied to a species. . . 397
167. On the terms 'species sensibilis,' ' species intelligibilis,'
' phantasia,' &c. &c. 399
CHAPTER III.
ON SELF-CHARITY.
168. General account of the question at issue on this subject
between Bossuet and Fenelon. 402
CONTENTS.
Iv
SECTION I.
On Mans Desire of Felicity.
1 69. Statement of the felicity-thesis, as advocated by Bossuet. . 404
170. This thesis opposed to Theology, Reason, and Expe-
rience 406
171. There is no one absolute end of human action. The
argument, brought from authority against this state- ment, carefully considered. ..... 409
SECTION II. On the Claims of Self- Chanty.
172. How far are we under the moral obligation of aiming at
felicity? . . . . . . . .419
173. First Principle. It is metaphysically impossible, that
what is morally obligatory shall be otherwise than conducive to our permanent happiness. . . . ib.
174. Second Principle. It is metaphysically impossible, that
one course of conduct shall be more morally worthy than another, without being also more conducive to our permanent happiness. ..... 420
175. Third Principle. Self-Charity is a virtuous end of action. ib.
1 76. Fourth Principle. If I aim at my own permanent hap-
piness, yet not for the virtuousness of so doing, still
the movement of my will on the whole is good. . 422
CHAPTER IV.
ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF CERTAINTY AND IMPOSSIBILITY.
177. Things may be certain objectively or subjectively. First
of subjective certainty. ...... 424
178. Experimental certainty. ...... ib.
179. Fundamental certainty 425
Ivi CONTENTS.
PAGE
180. Metaphysical certainty. ....... ib.
181. Physical certainty. ....... ib.
182. Moral certainty. . 426
183. Objective a priori certainty 427
184. Impossibility ; metaphysical, physical, and moral. . . 428
SUPPLEMENTARY SECTION.
BEING SECTION 4TH OF CHAPTER FIRST.
Catholic Authority on Independent Morality.
185. No Catholic can hold that Moral Obligation flows from
God's free Command 429
186. The condemnation of two certain propositions, cited in
opposition to the theory, that obligation flows entirely from His Necessary Command. . . . .431
187. Spiritual Exercises of S. Ignatius cited. . . . ib.
188. Suarez. 432
189. Vasquez 440
190. Lessius 441
191. Lugo. . 442
192. 'Plures ex antiquioribus et recentioribus,' adduced by
Lugo. ......... 444
193. Salas, adduced by. Lugo . . . . . ib.
194. Gregory and Gabriel, adduced by Lugo. . . . ib.
195. General views of theologians, as adduced by Lugo. . 445
196. Coninck, quoted textually by Lugo. .... ib.
197. Bellarmine cited. ........ ib.
198. Compton Carleton. ....... ib.
199. Berti 448
200. Frassen 449
201. Consideration of the condemned proposition on Philo-
sophical Sin. ........ 450
202. Viva's doctrine stated and opposed. . . . . 457
203. Gerdil cited in our favour. ...... 462
204. < Praelectiones Philosophic^.' 473
205. Solimani 474
206. Dmowski . . 477
207. ' Philosophia Lugdunensis.' ...... 479
208. Noget-Lacoudre. . . . . . . ib.
209. Chastel 481
210. Theologians cited, who hold that the idea 'morally good'
does not contain that of any relation to God. . . 483
211. Philosophers cited to the same effect 488
212. Conclusion of the Section. 489
BOOK FIRST.
PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
BOOK FIRST.
PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
I AM not professing, as you are well aware, to carry you through a regular course of Philosophy. I only wish to give you a full and complete grasp of certain great philosophical principles, which are essential to our subsequent theological course. We are not there- fore to be considered here as occupied with Philosophy for its own sake, but simply as an introduction to Dogmatic Theology.
We are met at starting by a great disadvantage, under which many other scientific courses also lie. It would be greatly desirable if the earlier part of our work could be rendered comparatively clear and easy; for by such means an interest might be excited in the study, and an ardour be stimulated for its prosecution, which would greatly animate and encourage you, in encountering any unavoidable difficulty which meets us in our path. It happens however most unfortun- ately, that the chief difficulties occur at the very outset ; they occur before you have had any opportunity of tasting the sweets (as I may say) of theological science, and of appreciating, even in a moderate degree, those most beautiful and attractive Objects, which it opens to our contemplation. For we must begin by the establish- ment of abstract principles ; and to master abstract
4 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
principles, is necessarily among the most laborious and ungrateful tasks in the world. I can only earnestly exhort you, to take that on faith, which you have as yet had no means of knowing by experience. I can only exhort you to believe, on the word of others, that whatever amount of discouraging and repulsive labour may meet you at the outset, the prize for which that labour is to be encountered, — I mean the mastery of dogmatical truth, — is so great and precious a treasure, as most abundantly and superabundantly to recompense you for all preliminary toil.
It will cost you then, I think, much more trouble to master the first Chapter of the first Book, than to apprehend any subsequent part of the entire study ; and it will give you much more trouble to master the first Section of that Chapter, than any subsequent por- tion. In regard indeed to the first Section, I beg you to pass and repass carefully in your mind the various statements therein contained, so as fully and familiarly to grasp them, before you attempt any study of the subsequent sections.
On my part, I will do all in my power to save you unnecessary trouble ; and I will state what I have to say, in the clearest and most intelligible language I can command. I heartily wish I had more power than (I know) belongs to me, of putting abstruse and recondite matter into an easy and familiar shape.
CHAPTER I.
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY.
SECTION I. On Intuitions and on the Principle of Certitude.
1. I MUST begin by begging your particular attention to a distinction, which seems to me very important, between two different classes of intellectual acts. I will call them respectively Judgments of Consciousness and Judgments of Intuition. And now to explain the meaning of this distinction.
I form tbe judgment, that I am this moment suffer- ing the sensation which we call cold. This is simply a judgment of consciousness: I reflect on the fact, that I am at this moment affected in a certain way ; the judgment begins there and ends there. Again, I form the judgment, that I am suffering under that which we call low spirits ; or that I am out of humour ; or the like. These are all judgments of consciousness ; the mind's reflection on its own actually present experience.
But now suppose I remember, that half an hour ago I endured the sensation of cold. Here first there is, or may be, a judgment of consciousness ; I may reflect on the impression which is now in my mind, that the past fact was so. But there is another judgment of far greater importance, which I also confidently form, and which we may call a judgment of intuition or an intui- tive judgment. I may judge confidently indeed, that I have the present impression of having undergone that
6 PHILOSOPHICAL INTKODUCTIOtf.
sensation ; but this is not all. I confidently form an- other judgment also : viz. that the sensation was under- gone ; that I actually did feel cold, at the time to which my thoughts refer. Moreover I regard this truth, not as known to me hy way of consequence or deduction from other truths ; but as known to me immediately and in itself. Such a judgment we may call a judg- ment of intuition : a judgment, which on the one hand is quite distinct from the mind's reflection on its own present consciousness ; and which on the other hand is quite distinct also, from a judgment arising in my mind in the way of consequence from other judgments.
As our second illustration of an intuitive judgment, let us take our various acts of belief in the validity of reasoning. A well-instructed thinker follows some chain of demonstrative reasoning, and forms the fol- lowing judgment without the faintest shadow of doubt: c if the various premisses are true, the various conclu- sions, here deduced from those premisses, are most cer- tainly true also.' He does not elicit merely a judgment of consciousness: i I am impressed with the idea that these conclusions are true, if the premisses are true ; I am so constituted that I cannot help thinking this to be so.' No ; he forms also an intuitive judgment. It is not merely ' I cannot help feeling as if the conclusions followed from the premisses,' but ' I see for certain that they do so follow.'
As a third instance, let us take mathematical axioms. ' A rectilineal figure of three sides has neither more nor less than three angles.' So soon as I under- stand the meaning of this proposition; — so soon as I can produce in my mind the representation of a three- sided figure, and have a moment's leisure for reflection ; — I judge at once that this proposition is quite cer- tainly true. I never think of confining myself to a subjective judgment ; ' I am so constituted that I cannot help thinking the proposition is true :' no ; the judgment which I form is objective; 'the propo- sition is true.'
As a fourth instance, let us take our belief in an
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF CERTITUDE. 7
external world. The great mass of men never think of confining themselves to a mere judgment of con- sciousness on this matter ; ' I am impressed as if there were external objects :' they always form an intuitive judgment, ' there are external objects.' It is well known that certain philosophers have existed, who deny that there are grounds for any such judgment. But it is no part of our business here to consider the arguments of these philosophers ; for we are not here considering how far these intuitive judgments are true, but explaining what is meant by an intuitive judgment. I say then, the great mass of men (rightly or wrongly) do, as a matter of fact, elicit the intuitive judgment, * external objects exist/ •
Such then are intuitive judgments, in the sense which we shall consistently assign to that word. They are judgments, which I do not hold as being inferred in any way from other judgments, but as immediately evident. Yet on the other hand they are totally distinct from what we call judgments of con- sciousness ; or, in other words, from the various reflec- tions made by my mind upon its actually present ex- perience. Many of the judgments, which we thus form, are true ; many are false : but, whether true or false, I will equally call them judgments of intuition, if they are immediate judgments, and yet not judgments of consciousness.
2. We must carefully distinguish however these intuitive judgments, from another numerous class which on the surface resemble them. There are very many judgments, which appear to be formed imme- diately ; in forming which, the mind does not reflect on any premisses from which they result ; but which nevertheless are in fact formed as conclusions from premisses. For instance. An experienced farmer goes into a corn-field, and says to himself, on looking around, 4 in what excellent condition and how abundant is this corn!' Yet this judgment, though so spontaneously formed, is in fact not elicited as immediately evident; it is elicited as a conclusion, resulting in part from various
8 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
judgments which already existed in his mind. These judgments will be such as the following.
(1.) c I remember a number of fields, in which the corn was in very good condition.'
(2.) ' These fields all agreed in certain charac- teristic marks.'
(3.) 'If certain marks prove one corn-field to be in a good state, marks precisely similar must prove another to be so.'
To these judgments, with which he was already familiar, one intuitive judgment is added, which he now elicits for the first time. ' There are in this field the same marks, which everywhere characterise a good con- dition of corn.'
All these various judgments go to make up the grounds, for his opinion on the corn-field before him. Most of them indeed are so familiar to him, and they are all formed so readily and inevitably, that he does not reflect upon them at all, and is inclined to fancy his judgment to be immediate. Yet it is manifest on a moment's consideration, that unless every one of the preceding judgments had passed through his mind, he could not by possibility have formed the original opinion which he did form. That opinion was in fact the conclusion resulting from a certain logical process ; and that process was built upon these respec- tive judgments, as among the premisses on which it rested. Let his belief be shaken in any one of these judgments, his opinion on the healthy state of the corn-field before him must at once fall to the ground.*
* One or two readers, I find, have doubted whether such opinions as the above are really inferential. There cannot, I think, be any kind of reasonable doubt that they are so, and philosophers (I believe) universally hold this. But it is no part of my province to contend for this statement ; for my arguments in the next Section would be but strengthened if it were denied. It is a very important proposition, advocated by me in the next Section, that 'moral judgments,' are 'intuitive.' I am obliged however to admit, that the mere fact of their appearing immediate is no sufficient proof of this ; because (as I here state) many inferential judgments appear intuitive. If this were denied, my arguments in the next Section would but proceed moreseasily and flowingly.
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 9
On the other hand take a really intuitive judgment : — for instance, 4I recently experienced the sensation of cold/ It is plain that I hold this, not as the conclusion of any logical process whatever ; — not as depending on any judgment, whether reflected on or not; — but in the strictest sense as an immediate conviction.
If our direct theme were Philosophy, it might be desirable to proceed at greater length, in illustrating this distinction ; but under our present circumstances, thus to have indicated it will suffice.
3. When we have sufficiently mastered the distinc- tion between the two kinds of immediate judgments, — Judgments of Consciousness and Judgments of Intui- tion,— we shall be able to understand wherein philoso- phical scepticism precisely consists. The only thesis, which expresses this theory with perfect consistency, is the following : — c We are unable to know with certainty anything whatever, beyond the facts of our actually present consciousness ; because no intuitive judgment can possibly carry with it its own evidence of truth.'
A thinker of this class may be imagined, with a cer- tain superficial consistency, to argue as follows : — ' There 4 can be no possible ground for holding any intuitive ' judgments ; and the mass of men, in confidently holding 4 them, are simply unreasonable. Take for instance the 4 case of memory ; — what imaginable reason canlhavefor 4 supposing, that those various impressions, which I call 4 acts of remembrance, correspond to real facts of my 4 past history ? How can I know, for instance, that I 4 have not been formed by some malignant being, who 4 has given me mendacious faculties for the very pur- 6 pose of deceiving me ? How can I know but that 4 this being makes me fancy I w^as cold e.g. a short 4 time ago, when I was really experiencing some totally 4 different sensation ? But this supposition indeed, — 4 the supposition of a malignant creator, — is only one, 4 out of a hundred which might be made; each one at * variance with the belief, that my memory can be 6 trusted. Surely I can have no more real ground for ' believing, that I have actually gone through those
10 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
4 various experiences, of which my memory presents 6 the impression, than a madman has for imagining 4 himself to be Csesar or Alexander the Great. * In c like manner, what possible ground have I for believing 4 that the conclusion of a syllogism really follows from 4 its premisses ? or again, that a rectilineal figure of 4 three sides has three angles? No doubt, I feel as if 4 these propositions were true ; I cannot help thinking 6 that they are true ; but what possible warrant have I 4 for inferring, from my own intellectual impotence,f 4 the truth of an objective and external fact ? I must ' remain then for ever, in a state of utter and hopeless 4 ignorance of everything, beyond the actually present 4 phenomena of self. I must remain, shut up (as it 4 were) within the region of present consciousness.'
4. Now in order to the true refutation of scepticism, we must beyond question deny its premiss : we must assert most confidently, in opposition to its theory, that certain intuitive judgments do carry with them their own evidence. Various thinkers however have, at various periods, taken a different course. These philosophers have admitted the sceptic's premiss, but joined issue with his conclusion. They have admitted
* " Une autre consequence egalement juste" (from that doctrine of scep- ticism which the author is opposing), " est que nous n'avons aucune certitude Gvidente de ce qu'hier il nous arriva ou ne nous arriva pas ; et meme si nous existions ou si nous n'existions pas. Je crois bien etre evidemment certain qu'hier j'6tais au monde ; mais c'est un jugement qui pent se trouver sujet d erreur, selon les philosophes dont nous parlous. Car, selon eux, je ne puis avoir d'evidence que par une perception intime qui est toujours actuelle ; or, actuellement, j'ai bien la perception du souvenir de ce qui m' arriva hier ; mais ce souvenir n'est qu'une perception intime de ce que je pense presentement, c'est-a-dire d'une pensee actuelle, laquelle n'est pas la meme chose que ce qui se passa hier et qui n'est plus aujourd'hui. Par la m6me raison, je serai encore moins certain si je ue suis par en ce monde depuis deux ou troismille ans, et si je n'ai point anim6 le corps d'un crocodile ou d'un moineau. II est tres-evident que je n'en ai aucune memoire ; mais tout cela s'est pu faire, sans que je m'en souvienne actuelle- ment ; comme il arrive effectivement que chacun de nous est demeure plusieurs mois dans le sein de sa mere, sans en avoir conserve le moindre souvenir. Ce manque de memoire n'est done pas une certitude evidente, centre ce qu'on voudrait supposer de I'anciennet6 de mon existence, et des situations differentes ou je me serais trouve" dans le systeme de la metempsy chose." — Burner, (Euvres Philosophiques, chap. iii. s. 20.
t This excellent phrase, ' intellectual impotence,' was used by an able writer signing himself M. in the ' Rambler' of September 1859.
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 11
that no intuitive judgment can carry with it its own evidence ; but to avoid the sceptic's inference on man's dense and utter ignorance, they have looked in other directions for proof of the trustworthiness of certain intuitions. They have maintained accordingly, that various intuitive judgments may be proved legitimate, by means of some prior self-evident truth. As these philosophers admit the sceptic's premiss, I may be per- mitted to call them semi-sceptics ; and I maintain that nothing can be more complete in itself,* than the reply, put forth by the more consistent sceptic, against any such attempt at compromise.
The semi-sceptic then professes to prove the trust- worthiness of certain intuitive judgments, by this or that course of argument. But this very fact, — viz. that he does appeal to argument, — furnishes his opponent with a triumphant retort. How do we believe that reasoning, in its most rigorous form, is really valid ? Evidently by an intuitive judgment. ' What can be 4 more illogical,' then the more consistent sceptic may proceed, * than your whole procedure ? You profess to prove that there are some intuitive judgments which may be trusted ; and in every step of your proof you assume that there are some which may be trusted : for the very profession of argument implies that pre- cise assumption.'
So much then on the mere fact that arguments are used against him at all. Let us next see the answers which are ready to his hand, in reply to the particular arguments which have been chiefly attempted. Thus Des Cartes puts the very hypothesis, which we have supposed the sceptic to make ; viz. that we may have been formed by some malignant being, who has implanted mendacious faculties for the very purpose of deceiving us. Des Cartes meets this difficulty, by setting himself to prove the existence of a Holy God ; and from this, as from a fundamental truth, he deduces the proposition,
* I say ' in itself :' because of course in a sceptic, the use of any reason- ing implies self-contradiction.
12 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
that we may most reasonably trust those faculties which He has implanted.* But how obvious is the sceptic's reply. 4 Either you believe in God's Existence by an ' immediate judgment of intuition, or you believe in it c as in a truth deduced from a chain of reasoning. In ' the former case, you take For granted the legitimacy 4 of that intuitive judgment ; in the latter case you take ' for granted the validity of reasoning. In either case ' you assume the precise proposition, which you under-
* take to prove ; viz. that there are trustworthy judg- ' ments of intuition/ Here again the argument is in itself irresistible.
Another mode of reasoning against the sceptic was devised by the unhappy La Mennais. He says : c We
* may derive confidence in various intuitive judgments, ' from the fact that all mankind agree, arid cannot but ' agree, in forming them.'
* My authority for this statement is Reid. His whole passage is worth considering.
' Des Cartes certainly made a false step in this matter ; for having suggested this doubt among others — that, whatever evidence he might have for his consciousness, his senses, his memory, or his reason, yet possibly some malignant being had given him those faculties on 'purpose to impose upon him ; and, therefore, that they are not to be trusted without a proper voucher ; — to remove this doubt, he endeavours to prove the being of a Deity who is no deceiver ; whence he concludes, that the faculties He had given him are true and worthy to be trusted.
'It is strange that so acute a reasoner did not perceive that in this reasoning there is evidently a begging of the question.
' For, if our faculties be fallacious, why may they not deceive us in this reasoning as well as in others ? and, if they are to be trusted in this instance without a voucher, why not in others ?
1 Every kind of reasoning for the veracity of our faculties, amounts to no more than taking their own testimony for their veracity ; and this we must do implicitly, until God gives us new faculties to sit in judgment upon the old. And the reason why Des Cartes satisfied himself with so weak an argument for the truth of his faculties, most probably was, that he never seriously doubted of it.
' If any truth can be said to be prior to all others in the order of nature, this seems to have the best claim; because, in every instance of assent, whether upon intuitive, demonstrative, or probable evidence, the truth of our faculties is taken for granted, and is, as it were, one of the premisses on which our assent is grounded. How then come we to be assured of this fundamental truth, on which all others rest ? Perhaps evidence, as in many other respects it resembles light, so in this also — that, as light, which is the discoverer of all visible objects, discovers itself at the same time, so evidence, which is the voucher of all truth, vouches for itself at the same time.
' This however is certain, that such is the constitution of the human
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 13
But the sceptic's answer here is in itself no less triumphant than in the former cases. 4 Unless you as- 4 sume that certain intuitive judgments may be trusted, 6 you can have no knowledge whatever of the fact that ' men do agree in trusting them : you cannot under- ' stand the very meaning of a single sentence which is 4 uttered by your fellow-men ; nay, you cannot so much 4 as apprehend its external bodily sound. I say, you ' cannot so much as apprehend the very sound, of which c a spoken sentence is composed, unless you assume 4 that certain intuitive judgments may be trusted. You * are hearing at this moment the last word of the sen- 4 tence ; but how do you know the other words of which 4 it consists ? Simply by remembering them : either 4 then you must trust that kind of intuitive judgment 4 which we call an act of memory, or else you cannot ' apprehend the very sound of which a spoken sentence 4 is composed. And as for the meaning of such sentence, 4 it is still more manifest that various exercises of me-
mind, that evidence, discerned by us, forces a corresponding degree of assent. And a man who perfectly understood a just syllogism, without believing that the conclusion follows from the premisses, would be a greater monster than a man born without hands or feet.
' We are born under a necessity of trusting to our reasoning and judging powers ; and a real belief of their being fallacious cannot be maintained for any considerable time by the greatest sceptic, because it is doing violence to our constitution. It is like a man's walking upon his hands : a feat which some men, upon occasion, can exhibit ; but no man ever made a long journey in this manner. Cease to admire his dexterity, and he will, like other men, betake himself to his legs.' — Reid's Inquiry, Essay vi. Chap. v.
Gioberti quotes the following passage from Jouffroy, which may also be cited in illustration :
1 Quand une faculte vient a s'appliquer et a nous donner la notion qui lui est propre, il est evident que nous ne croyons et ne pouvons croire a la verite de cette notion, qu'a une premiere condition ; c'est que nous avons
foi a la veracite native de cette faculte car pour peu que nous en
doutions, il ii'y a plus de verite, plus de croyance, possible pour nous. Et cependant rien ne prouve, rien ne peut prouver, cette veracite native de
DOS facultes Done, messieurs, le principe de tout certitude et de
toute croyance est d'abord un acte de foi aveugle en la veracite naturelle de nos facultes.' — Cours de Droit Naturel.
I find this passage quoted in M. Alary' s French translation of Gioberti's " Introduction to Philosophy, vol. ii. note 33, p. 362." I suppose I need hardly add, that I am very far from agreeing with it. I maintain, as will be seen, that the ' natural veracity of our faculties' is a truth, in no way resting upon ' blind faith,' but brought home to us with perfect evidence by a most clear light.
14 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
4 mory are requisite, in order that you may ever so ' distantly guess it.'
5. It is very curious to see how completely a sceptic overreaches himself, if he set himself thus frankly and energetically to carry out his principles. For the sceptic's argument, above stated, lands us in this con- clusion:— that we cannot begin listening to his objec- tions, we cannot so much as know that there is such a doctrine as scepticism in the world, until we have first committed ourselves to its denial; until we have taken for granted that precise thesis, which scepticism rejects. Unless I can trust my various acts of memory, I don't even know what the sceptic says, much less what he means. But if I can trust these acts of memory, then certain intuitive judgments may with reason be con- fidently formed ; which is the very point at issue between him and myself.
Here then we fully see the truth of what sound philosophers continually say ; viz. that to attempt argu- ment against scepticism is a simple absurdity. I cannot know what the sceptic says, until I have elicited con- fidently various acts of memory ; i.e. have trusted one class of intuitive judgments : and I cannot argue against what he says, until I have trusted another. For to argue implies a belief in the validity of those processes of reasoning which I adduce ; and what can such a belief possibly be, except one or more intuitive judgments ?
Yet let this be most carefully observed. While on the one hand it is a simple absurdity to argue against scepticism, on the other hand to hold sceptical opinions in their full consistency, is not less than physically impossible. As a first proof of this take the following. I have just said, that until we have committed ourselves to anti- sceptical opinions, we cannot even listen to the arguments brought against them. The converse is equally true. The sceptic complains that men in general most unreasonably trust their intuitive judg- ments. Now consider this most noteworthy circum- stance : he cannot know, or have the most distant idea, that the fact is so, until he has himself followed their
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 15
example; until he has trusted at least one class of intuitive judgments, viz. various acts of memory. Unless he first trust those acts, he cannot so much as guess at the opinion of his fellow-men on any single particular (see n. 4). Now I ask, has he really the physical power of doubting in many cases what their opinion is?
For another instance, the story told of Pyrrho is well known. He was lecturing to his disciples, it is said, on the inability of our faculties to apprehend truth ; when a waggon suddenly came rushing down the hill, and the sceptical philosopher was the first who took to flight. We may ask, — had he so much as the physical power at that moment, really to distrust that faculty of memory, through which alone he had the means of so much as guessing, that he was in any danger at all ? evidently not. So in like manner, let any one of us try to regard it as really doubtful, whether he was experiencing a minute ago what his memory declared him to have been experiencing ; — let any one try to do this, and he will see readily the truth of my remark, that the task is physically impossible. He can no more compel himself really to doubt that he was ex- periencing those sensations or those thoughts which he distinctly remembers, — in other words, he can no more prevent himself from holding a certain intuitive judg- ment with the most undoubting confidence, — than he can raise himself into the air and fly to the top of a tree.
6. We have arrived, then, at two vitally important results. (1.) If we once admit the sceptic's premiss, — viz. that no intuitive judgment can carry with it its own evidence, — we are most irresistibly brought to his conclusion, that no such judgments are trustworthy at all. (2.) This conclusion is such, that no human being has so much as the physical power really to believe it. I would say this to the professing sceptic : — take the dearest and oldest friend you have in the world ; either maintain that you have not the means even of guessing that you ever saw him before in your life, or else admit that your whole scheme is a delusion and a mockery.
16 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
7. At the same time I fully admit, that the sceptic's doubts need not, in consistency, extend to what I have called (n. 1) Judgments of Consciousness. Such judg- ments, in fact, amount to no more than this; "my present feeling is what I now feel it to be:'' and the truth of such judgments as these would not certainly be questioned, by the most consistent advocate (if such a person could be found) of philosophical scepticism. Put even the impossible case supposed by Des Cartes ; put the case, that I had been created by some malignant being, who has given me mendacious faculties for the very purpose of deceiving me. Well : even such a being as this could not make me imagine, that my present feeling is not what I now feel it to be.
We need not, however, enlarge on this proposition : there are two reasons why we need not do so. Firstly, it is one of those propositions, which are in themselves so clear, that their luminousness is obscured, not intensified, by amplification and expansion. Secondly, so far is this proposition from being essential to my argument, that, on the contrary, my argument would be even (if possible) increased in strength, were I able to deny it. My argument, I say, would be even increased in strength, were I able to affirm, that the sceptic is called upon by his principles to deny the facts of actually present consciousness. He is not, however, so called upon ; and it may suffice, once for all, thus to have fairly stated what is certainly undeniable.
8. I have been led thus to enlarge on the sceptical position, for this reason among others. There are two false principles, in extreme antagonism to each other, against which the Catholic philosopher has specially to guard ; because they are far more prominent and pervasive, than any other philosophical errors which can be named. They are the Scylla and Charybdis, between which the bark of true Philosophy must direct its course. The one of these is Scepticism, the other Rationalism. But there is this most remarkable difference between the two errors. Rationalism can be most abundantly re- futed on its own chosen ground, — the ground of Reason.
ON INTUITIONS AND THE P1UNCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 17
If the orthodox combatant be at all equally matched with the rationalist, the latter's signal overthrow is quite certain. But the case is very different, where scepticism is our opponent ; for when we have to assail it, our very weapons of offence fall from our paralyzed hands. We set out to refute it on grounds of Reason : but we are at once reminded, that we are simply begging the question at issue ; and that the very point to be determined is, c Can Reason be legitimately trusted?'
Scepticism, then, is a far more destructive and desolating error, even than its extreme opposite. It represents all knowledge of Truth, great or little, as simply impossible ; it corrupts Philosophy at its very source. Our very first philosophical enterprise must be the overthrow of that error, which (once admitted) would render all thought and all knowledge impossible.
Yet, against such a doctrine, or rather such a negation of all possible doctrine, what is to be done ? Reason against it we can not; for to reason (as the more consistent sceptic urges) is to assume the whole question at issue. It will be found however that we can accomplish, what will be amply sufficient in practice to overthrow the error.
Firstly, we, who are not sceptics in any sense, — we, who deny the sceptic's premiss as well as his conclusion, — may communicate with each other, and make our combined observation on the enemy. We remark to each other, that it is physically impossible for any human being to carry out consistently the sceptical principle ; and that every professing sceptic is (by consequence) in a simply self-contradictory position.
Secondly, there are great numbers of thinking men, who are more or less deeply infected with the sceptical poison, — some indeed to a very considerable extent. — who yet by no means carry their principles to the length of distrusting their reasoning faculty. Indeed, total distrust of the reasoning faculty, is one of those sceptical demonstrations which are not less than phy- sically impossible. Those men therefore, who will
18 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
admit reasoning at all, may be addressed by means of reasoning. We can bring them face to face with the full meaning of their position. We can labour at oringing home to their reason, and again to their imagination, the extent of that pitiable and debasing ignorance, which is the only consistent result attainable in that position. We can deter them from unwarily acquiescing in some among the less monstrous exhibitions of the sceptical principle, by showing them what that principle is, in its only full and consistent development.
Thirdly, we can trace back this whole principle to the primary argumentative source from which it results. This I consider that wre have already done in the present Section. We have taken one particular pre- miss; viz. ' it is impossible that any intuitive judgment 4 can carry with it its own evidence of truth : ' and we have shown, that this premiss leads by legitimate con- sequence to the full-length sceptical whole. The sceptical premiss, I say, leads to the sceptical conclusion, by logic so absolutely clear and irresistible, that no one, who admits the validity of reasoning at all, can possibly deny the necessary connexion of the two.
9. We may very suitably, therefore, designate the con- tradictory of this premiss, as the Principle of Certitude. In other words, the Principle of Certitude will be this proposition : c it is fully possible that intuitive judgments ' may carry with them their own evidence of truth.' And this proposition may well be called the Principle of Certitude ; because, unless we confidently maintain it, it will be impossible consistently to recognise the certainty (or even approximation to certainty) of any one thing, beyond our actually present experience. If this principle were untrue, our knowledge would be less than that of the brutes ; it would be strictly con- fined to the mind's reflection at each instant on its own existing consciousness. We could not compare e.g. our present consciousness with our past ; for unless the Principle of Certitude were true, we could not even
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 19
guess what our past consciousness lias been. Much less, as is evident, could we even contemplate comparing our own consciousness with that of others.
To ask for proof of this principle, is manifestly illogical. If certain intuitions carry with them their own evidence of truth, that evidence is our reasonable ground for accepting them as true. We may then proceed to reflect on the fact, that we do thus legiti- mately hold various intuitive judgments on their own evidence ; and this reflection is in itself an assertion of the principle before us. The only further question, which you can reasonably ask, is 4 what is the nature of
* that evidence on which these intuitions rest?' and of that we will expressly speak before we close the Section.
This then is our direct and appropriate proof: yet we are able (as has been seen) to give, over and above, an indirect demonstration of our principle, founded on the manifestly false consequences which would result from its denial. We can give such a demonstration, I say, to all who admit that there can be such a thing in rerum naturd as a demonstration. I would reply as follows to the sceptic. If you deny the legitimacy of reasoning, you commit a simple absurdity in asking for a proof at all. But if you admit the validity of proof at all, I offer you the strongest possible proof of our principle, in the shape of a ' reductio ad absurdum.' If our principle be not true, you have no ground for trusting e.g. the simplest and most obvious act of memory ; you have no ground for knowing, that you ever saw in your life that person, who is your dearest and most intimate friend. But this is a conclusion so undeniajbly false, that no human being has so much as the physical power of believing it. Hence the premiss, from which the con- clusion resulted, is also false ; and our principle, being the contradictory of that premiss, is undeniably true.
10. It may plausibly be objected then : ' if no one
* has the physical power of consistently questioning the 4 Principle of Certitude, where is the importance of thus 1 laboriously presenting and illustrating it?' I reply, it is true indeed that no human being can consistently
20 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
question it ; i. e. can really believe those propositions, which inevitably result from its denial. Still, though this be so, many philosophers have denied it partially and inconsistently: i.e. they have denied it in itself, though they have refrained from carrying that denial to its legitimate consequences. And as the first instance of my statement, strangely enough, I can cite one among the most eminent and most sober English philosophers of the present day — Mr. Mansel.
Take for instance the following passage from his "Prolegomena Logica:" —
" It may be indeed, that the condition of possible thought cor- respond to conditions of possible being ; that what is to us incon- ceivable is in itself non-existent. But of this, from the nature of the case, it is impossible to have any evidence. If man as a thinker is subject to necessary laws, he cannot examine the absolute validity of the laws themselves, except by assuming the whole question at issue ; for such examination must itself be conducted in subordination to the same conditions. Whatever weakness, therefore, there may be in the object of criticism, the same must necessarily affect the critical process itself.
" We may indeed believe, and ought to believe, that the powers which our Creator has bestowed upon us are not given as the instru- ments of deception. We may believe, and ought to believe, that, intellectually no less than morally, the present life is a state of discipline and preparation for another ; and that the portion of knowledge which our limited faculties are permitted to attain to here may, indeed, in the eyes of a higher Intelligence, be but partial truth, but cannot be absolute falsehood. But in believing thus, we desert the evidence of Reason to rest on that of Faith ; and of the principles on which Reason itself depends, it is obviously impos- sible to have any other guarantee.
"But such a faith, however well founded, has but a regulative and practical, not a speculative, application. It bids us rest content within the limits which have been assigned to us: it cannot enable us to overleap them, or to exalt to a more absolute character the conclusions obtained by finite thinkers concerning finite objects of thought. For the same condition, which dis- qualifies us from criticising the laws of thought, must also deprive us of the power of ascertaining, how much of the results of those laws is true in itself, and how much is relative and dependent upon the particular bodily or mental constitution of man during the present
v'lfis*
* The italics are not Mr. MansePs.
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 21
Considerable question has been raised as to Mr. Hansel's meaning here : but the more I consider the passage, the clearer it appears to me that Mr. Mansel, in each separate paragraph, states or implies a denial of what we have called the ' Principle of Certitude.'
In the first paragraph he takes for granted, what all of course admit ; the existence of certain ' necessary laws ' to which ' man as a thinker is subject.' There cannot be a more undoubted instance of such laws, than our firm conviction, that the conclusion of a syllogism really follows from its premisses. Now every one, who reads the first paragraph above quoted, will recognise in it the proposition, that ' it is impossible to have any evidence ' as to ' the absolute validity ' of those laws. 'It is impossible to examine such validity, except by assuming the whole question;' — this is expressly stated. ' It is impossible to have any evidence of such validity without examination,' — this is manifestly implied : for, if it were admitted as possible that there could be such evidence, the whole paragraph would become totally unmeaning. 'We are so constituted,' Mr. Mansel im- plies, ' that we cannot help regarding the conclusion of a syllogism as resulting from the premisses ; but whether it really do so result, — of this "from the nature of the case it is impossible to have any evi- dence.'" But certainly no other intuitive judgment carries with it stronger evidence of truth, than does this judgment, that syllogistic reasoning is cogent. Hence, ' from the nature of the case it is impossible,' according to our author, c that any intuitive judgment can carry with it its own evidence of truth.'
The second paragraph maintains that " the portion of knowledge, which our faculties are permitted to attain, cannot be absolute falsehood :" yet ' even this moderate degree of certainty,' he adds, 'is not attainable by Reason ; we can have no " other guarantee" for it than " faith." Now it would carry us much too far, to consider the philosophical value of this most extraordinary state- ment, that Faith is our guarantee for the legitimacy of
22 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
Reason : * and our immediate question is not the value but the meaning of Mr. Hansel's theory. And of its meaning there can surely be no doubt. If it be possi- ble that intuitive judgments may carry with them their own evidence of truth, it is possible to have some other guarantee, besides Faith, of 'the principles on which Eeason depends/ But Mr. Manscl considers it "ob- viously impossible to have any other guarantee." Mr. Mansel therefore considers it obviously impossible, that intuitive judgments can carry with them their own evidence of truth. And this is the precise opinion, which I ascribe to him.
I should add here, however, that when Mr. Mansel speaks of c Faith,' he does not contemplate exclusively a special and authenticated Revelation : he includes under the phrase (as I have good reason to believe) Faith in that primitive Revelation, on God's Existence and Attributes, which was made to man at his creation, and which is still continued throughout the world. This does not in the least affect my argument ; but it is necessary to the appreciation of the author's meaning.
Lastly, the third paragraph above quoted refers again to the ' laws of thought ; ' including of course our belief, that the conclusion of a syllogism really follows from the premisses. " We have no power of ascertain- ing," he says, "how much of the result of those laws is true in itself, and how much is dependent " on our natural " constitution " of body or mind. Mr. Mansel holds then, that we have no power of ascertaining whether the conclusion of a syllogism do really follow from its premisses : or whether our belief that it does so, is simply " dependent on our particular bodily or mental constitution."
I really cannot see any opening for doubt, as to Mr. Mansel's meaning ; and in the earlier part of this Section
* I may briefly however ask, what is an act of Divine Faith, except a certain exercise of Reason ; viz. the believing of this or that truth on God's Word ? If we have no independent ground for trusting our Reason, what sufficient ground can there possibly be for our act of Faith ?
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 23
I have said (I trust) what is abundantly sufficient to refute his doctrine. Here, however, I may be allowed briefly to state what that doctrine really comes to, and submit it to his own maturer judgment. Mr. Hansel's doctrine then is in fact this. ' Unless we lived under a ' Divine Revelation, we could not even guess, whether 'the conclusion of a syllogism really results from its ' premisses ; or whether on the other hand our necessary ' belief tlisit it does so, is a mere delusion, resulting from 'our particular mental constitution. Since, however, 'we do enjoy the light of Divine Revelation, we know ' not indeed that this belief is precisely true, but that c it cannot be absolutely and totally false/
Again surely, as I just now incidentally urged, those intuitive judgments which we call acts of memory, cannot possibly be alleged to have greater means of carrying with them their own evidence of truth, than have those intuitive judgments, whereby we recognise the validity of reasoning. Indeed they apparently fall under Mr. Mansel's very words : for if I was cold some short time ago, then my present impression of /laving then been cold, is a c necessary law,' to which ' as a thinker I am subject.' According to Mr. Mansel then, were it not for Revelation, my memory would give me no ground for so much as guessing that I was cold a short time ago : ' nay even with the light of Reve- ' lation,' according to him, ' I cannot know for certain ' that I was cold a short time ago ; but only that this 4 belief of mine is not absolutely and totally false.'
I would ask Mr. Mansel — with most sincere re- spect, and with great admiration of his many high philo- sophical gifts, — whether in this shape he could himself accept his own theory?*
*• The greater part of Mr. Hansel's passage, above quoted, occurs agaiu in the author's Bampton Lectures (p. 145, 6.) It will be of some value then, towards ascertaining his meaning, if we say a few words on the argument of those lectures.
Their main object is to recommend the conclusion, that we cannot possess any direct knowledge on the Infinite and the Absolute. Now my present purpose leads me to consider, not how far this proposition is true, but what is the argument by which the author supports it. Let us enter on this question. There are two totally distinct syllogisms, either of which
24 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
A further reason for thinking that I have correctly seized Mr. Hansel's meaning, will be the effect produced by his writings on his most unreserved admirers. I may refer, in illustration of this, to an essay, which un- doubtedly displays considerable earnestness and ability. It is a most eulogistic review of Mr. Mansel's Bampton Lectures, which appeared in the c Guardian ' newspaper of Dec. 7, 1859. No words can possibly be more ex- plicit than the following, which I take from that Essay.
" We look for the foundation and for the limit of our belief in our own faculties) to the deep-seated instinct which tells us that God cannot deceive. Reason cannot guarantee itself. . . . Surely the religious instinct, which bids us trust in God, is the one primary premiss of all truths. Neither sense nor reason can warrant them- selves : we believe them, because we believe that God gave them and that in giving them He must needs have given us Truth/'
Strange indeed that this writer never asked himself the question, — how can we know that we have a Creator, or that that Creator is Veracious, except through the highest and choicest acts of Reason ? If the writer considers that we know these great truths immediately, he considers, in other words, that we know them through certain intuitive judgments : i.e. through certain momentous acts of Reason, appertaining to the class which we call 'intuitions.' If he holds that we know these truths by inference, he holds that we know them by means (1) of certain intuitive judgments, and (2) of a certain process of inference, based upon those judgments. In either case then, we know these
would land us in the desired conclusion : and it is of great importance that we shall precisely understand, which of these two syllogisms is the one which Mr. Mansel adopts.
SYLLOGISM I.
' Major Premiss. Whatever Reason really declares is really certain.
'Minor Premiss. But Reason really declares, that we have no direct ' knowledge of the Infinite and the Absolute.
' Conclusion. Hence it is certain, that we have no direct knowledge of * the Infinite and the Absolute.'
SYLLOGISM II.
' Major Premiss. No declaration of Reason suffices to give us certain 1 knowledge ; (because no such declaration can carry with it its own ' evidence of truth.)
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 25
truths through the highest and choicest acts of Reason ; and cannot possibly know them in any other way. But if Reason cannot 'guarantee itself,' what 'guarantee* exists, or can possibly exist, for those acts of Reason, which give us our knowledge of God's Existence and Veracity ? From such principles as these, the necessary consequence is nothing less than scepticism, the most bewildering and the most desolating, 'Reason cannot guarantee itself;' hence there is no possible guarantee for the truth of Reason's declaration, that there exists a Veracious Creator. But this particular declaration of Reason is c the one primary premiss of all truths ;' hence, according to our reviewer, ' there is no possible guaran- tee ' for ' the one primary premiss of all truths.' If all truths be derived from one primary premiss, — and if, for the truth of that premiss, there can be no possible gua- rantee,— the only inference is, that we have no reason- able ground whatever for believing any thing at all.
11. I will take my second instance, from a school of philosophy the most opposed to Mr. Mansel, — the so- called philosophy of experience: a school, of which perhaps Mr. Stuart Mill may be cited as the worthiest English representative. These philosophers claim as their special characteristic, that they build wholly upon experience ; ' and this,' they proceed to say, ' is the only ' sure basis of philosophy : for once abandon the solid 'ground of experience, each man will at every turn ' mistake his own personal fancies and prepossessions 'for absolute truth.'
1 Minor Premiss. But whatever direct knowledge is professed of the ' Infinite and the Absolute, is merely the declaration of Reason.
' Conclusion. Hence we do not really possess any certain knowledge of 1 the Infinite and the Absolute.'
These two syllogisms, I have said, are totally distinct ; but indeed, as regards the question before us, they are absolutely contradictory. The Major Premiss of the second expressly denies, that which the Major Premiss of the first as expressly affirms ; viz. that a real declaration of Reason is certainly true. Now plainly, in regard to the passage quoted in the text, there can be no doubt which of the above syllogisms it is intended to sup- port. It is absolutely impossible, by any stretch of ingenuity, to adduce it in confirmation of the first syllogism : for it has not the remotest tendency to support the Minor, and it has a very obvious tendency to overthrow the Major. On the other hand, the tendency of the whole passage (if its argument were admitted) towards establishing the Major of the second
26 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
I would ask of these philosophers, do they mean by ' experience ' the experience of the present moment, or do they include past experience also ? If they say the former, I reply it is obviously false that they do in any sense build their philosophy wholly, or chiefly, on experience. But if they answer (as they most certainty will) that they do include past experience as well as present, then again I deny their allegation, that they build their philosophy wholly on experience ; and I proceed thus to argue against them, on behalf of my denial.
You make use of your own past experience, — you make use of other men's experience, — as part of the foundation on which you build. How can you even guess what your past experience has been ? By trusting memory. But how do you prove that those various intuitive judgments, which we call acts of memory, can rightly be trusted ? So far from this being provable by past experience, it must be in each case assumed and taken for granted, before you can have any cognizance whatever of your past experience.
Moreover, from these facts of past and present ex- perience, you deduce argumentative conclusions. In so doing, you assume in each single instance the validity of the reasoning process. It cannot be even superficially or plausibly maintained, that these various judgments, — ' the conclusion here truly results from the premisses,7 — that these various judgments (I say) are derivable from experience.
syllogism, is so irresistibly obvious, that further words are superfluous on so plain a fact. It seems beyond question then, that in this passage, at all events, a denial of what we have called the ' Principle of Certitude ' is the very basis on which the author's argument has been built.
Still I am far from meaning to imply, that Mr. Mansel never uses the first syllogism to prove his conclusion : for in one or two places he undoubtedly does so. Thus (p. 36) he expresses distinctly the very im- portant truth, that ' Reason itself, rightly interpreted, teaches the existence of truths above Reason.' And the following passage again, is so justly and admirably expressed, that nothing can possibly be more so.
" Reason does not deceive us, if we will only read her witness aright ; " and Reason herself gives us warning, when we are in danger of reading it " wrong. The light that is within us is not darkness ;' only it cannot " illuminate that which is beyond the sphere of its rays." (p. 198.)
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 27
At all events then you are compelled to assume two large classes of judgments, — and those of most vital importance, — on no ground of experience whatever : viz. that (1) your various acts of memory, and (2) also your various acts of reasoning, correspond with Objective Truth. In making these tremendous assump- tions, why are you not also exposed to that danger, which you would fain represent as exclusively besetting your opponents ; — the danger of mistaking your own personal fancies and ideas for absolute Truth ? You will reply perhaps, that you assume no more than all mankind necessarily assume. I will give one only, of the many replies which might be made to that state- ment; — and I answer thus. You assume proposi- tions of these two classes, before you know, or can so much as guess, that any other man living assumes them ; for it is only by means of their assumption, that it is possible to know, or even so much as to guess, what other men's opinions are.
As it is most desirable to bring this point quite clearly home, I will cite and apply a passage, in which Mr. Stuart Mill states his own philosophical doctrine.
' There is no knowledge a priori ; no truths cognisable by the ' mind's inward light, and grounded on intuitive evidence. Sensa- ' tion, and the mind's consciousness of its own acts, are not only * the exclusive sources, but the sole materials, of our knowledge.'*
Let us test then, by these principles, an act of memory. I am at this moment comfortably warm ; but I call to mind with great clearness the fact, that a short time ago I was very cold. What datum does ' sensation ' give me? simply that I am now warm. What datum
With this sentiment (I need hardly say) I most cordially agree, and am very grateful to the author for such valuable and important enunciations. But the direct philosophical charge which I would venture to bring, is the following. Two different syllogisms are separately available, in behalf of Mr. Mansel's conclusion ; syllogisms, however, which it is impossible logically to combine, because the Major Premiss of the one directly con- tradicts the Major Premiss of the other. But Mr. Mansel, it appears to me, has most illogically united these antagonistic syllogisms. He passes from one to the other with apparent unconsciousness, and without in any way recognising their mutual inconsistency.
* This passage is the one cited from Mr. Mill by an able writer in the 'National Review,' to whom I shall again have occasion to refer.
28 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
does i consciousness ' give? that I have the present im- pression of having been cold a short time ago. But both these data are altogether wide of the mark. The question which I would earnestly beg Mr. Mill to ask himself, is this ; — what is my ground for believing, that I was cold a short time ago? ' I have the present impres- ' sion of having been cold a short time ago ;' — this is one judgment. ' I was cold a short time ago ;' — this is a totally distinct and separate judgment. There is no necessary, nor any even probable, connexion between these two judgments, — no ground whatever for thinking that the truth of one follows from the truth of the other, — except upon the hypothesis, that my mind is so constituted as accurately to represent past facts. But how will either 4 sensation ' or ; consciousness,' 01* the two combined, in any way suffice for the establishment of any such pro- position ?
Those who have maintained the 4 experience ' theory, differ widely from each other, as to the degree of religious belief which they have professed : I will therefore so state my argument, as to cover every pos- sible case of belief and unbelief. Either my soul ( 1 ) was created by some Superior Being; or (2) was caused by some non-creative agency ; or (3) started into existence without any cause at all. These three alternatives are logically exhaustive. If the first alternative be taken by the ' experience ' philosopher, I ask him this question : how can c sensation and con- sciousness' suffice to shew that the Creator is Veracious? that he has so formed my soul, that my own present im- pression of a certain past sensation corresponds (even in any degree whatever) to a certain past fact? to the fact, namely, that I really experienced that sensation, at the time to which my memory refers? If the second al- ternative be taken, I ask a similar question : How can 'sensation and consciousness' suffice to shew, that this non-creative cause has issued in the production of a soul, possessing this singular and admirable endowment, that my present impression of a certain past sensation cor- responds (even in any degree whatever) to a certain
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 29
past fact? the fact, namely, that I really experienced that sensation, at the time to which my memory refers ? If the third alternative be taken, I ask again a similar question : How can 'sensation and consciousness' suffice to shew, that the soul, which has thus without any cause started into existence, is so singularly and ex- quisitely constituted, that my present impression of a certain past sensation corresponds (even though it were in ever so faint a degree) to a certain past fact? the fact, namely, that I really experienced that sensation, at the time to which my memory refers?
For the sake of fixing our ideas, I have confined my remarks to the case of memory. But it is plain, that every thing which I have said equally applies to the case of reasoning; and to the assumption, universally made by the experience school, that the syllogistic process is objectively valid. It is undeniable then, that these philosophers cannot possibly maintain their ground. 'Sensation and consciousness' are not suffi- cient foundations for any knowledge, which shall exceed, or even equal, that of the brutes (see n. 9). These thinkers, no less than others, must admit various in- tuitive judgments, as carrying with them their own evidence of truth. They may join issue no doubt, as to the number of legitimate intuitions, or on the test of their legitimacy. But all this is in no wise a question of principle ; it is wholely and solely a question of degree. As soon as they have admitted one, they have abandoned the characteristic tenet of their school.*
* The citation made in the text of Mr. Mansel and Mr. Mill, as types of sceptical philosophy, was also made in this volume as it was printed last October. After that period, I read with great interest an article in the 'National Review' (Oct. 1859), on Mr. Stuart Mill, which contains a remarkable agreement of opinion. I am well aware, how very serious are the differences between a Christian writer like Mr. Mansel, and such an un- believing philosopher as Kant ; still Mr. Mansel would himself admit, that those philosophical utterances of his, which I venture to regard as semi- sceptical, have their origin in the Kantian school. It must be considered then an instance of agreement, that the * National Review ' unites the schools of Kant and of Mill in one category. He says that, amidst the striking contrasts which exist between these two schools of thought, they agree in depriving us (if they could establish their respective principles) of all means for knowing certainly Objective Truth. I have net the article at hand this moment, and therefore quote from memory.
30 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
12. We have sufficiently shewn then, that the pos- sibility of our possessing any knowledge worthy of the name, rests (1), upon the circumstance, that it is possible for intuitive judgments to carry with them their own evidence of truth ; and (2), on the circumstance, that certain intuitive judgments do carry with them such evidence. Your next question will be, Of what nature is that evidence ? And this question it is the more impor- tant to answer distinctly, because some of you have most seriously misunderstood what I intended to convey.*
To simplify the matter as much as possible, let us take for illustration (as hitherto we have chiefly done) two classes of intuitions, which are really and undeniably legitimate. Let us take (1), those intuitions, wherein I judge that I really experienced sensations which I dis- tinctly remember ; and that I experienced them moreover at the time, to which my memory refers back. Let us take (2), those intuitions wherein I judge, — a syllogism having been drawn out in its logical shape, — that its conclusion really follows from its premisses.
Some of you then have understood me to maintain, that my belief in the truth of these judgments is the conclusion of a syllogism. Thus : —
4 Major Premiss. My memory may be trusted.
4 Minor Premiss. My memory testifies this past * sensation.
' Conclusion, Hence I may know that I really did experience that sensation.'
Or again,
4 Major Premiss. My reasoning faculty may be 4 trusted.
' Minor Premiss. My reasoning faculty testifies 4 that this conclusion really results from those premisses.
4 Conclusion, Hence I know that it does so result.'
But nothing would be more preposterous than such a notion as this ; and I never imagined anything at all like it. In the first place, it is contrary to the clearest facts. Children e.g. distinctly remember past sensa-
* It was not some of my pupils who thus misunderstood me, but some of those who read the present volume as it was printed in October.
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 31
tions, — as their having seen their mother's or their nurse's face, — long before they think of the universal judgment, that memory may be trusted. Indeed, multitudes of men (I suppose) pass through life, having remembered in their time a vast variety of past events, without having once formally elicited any such uni- versal judgment.
But there is a second objection to this absurd theory, even more peremptory than the adverse testimony of facts. Such a theory is logically self-contradictory. It is impossible that I can avail myself of a syllogism, without holding confidently two intuitive judgments. The first of these judgments is an act of memory; for I cannot draw the conclusion, without remembering the premisses. The second is an act, whereby I recognise that the conclusion does really follow from the pre- misses. You see, then, how impossible it is that our ground for confidently forming intuitive judgments can be any syllogistic process. You see that the very opposite to this is undeniable. So far from a syllogistic process being our ground for trusting intuitive judg- ments, we must, by absolute necessity, trust certain in- tuitive judgments, before we can have reasonable grounds for trusting any syllogistic process whatever.
It is very manifest, indeed, since the number of judgments which we form is not infinite, that there must be certain judgments, which are not derived by reasoning from any previous judgments whatever. These judgments, if legitimate, and if they are not the mind's mere reflection on its actually present con- sciousness, are precisely what we call intuitive judg- ments, carrying with them their own evidence of truth. In other words, my soul is so constituted, that I not only elicit certain intuitive judgments, but elicit them with full grounds of knowing their truth. My soul possesses a certain intrinsic quality, which gives me full evidence of their truth at the very moment when I elicit them. When I return (after a few hours' absence) to my children, I know, and have the fullest intrinsic ground for knowing, that I have seen their faces before.
32 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
When I put together the premisses, ' All men are mortal/ and 'I am a man;' — and when from those premisses I draw the conclusion that CI am mortal;' — I have full ground for my confidence, that this inference is legiti- mate. This ground of confidence in either case is, and can be, nothing else, except the operation of a certain intrinsic mental quality.
In regard, then, to various judgments of intuition which might be named, I cannot admit for one moment that they are either less certain, or less immediate, than judgments of consciousness. All which can be said is, that judgments of intuition, however certain, require for their evidence the operation of a certain intrinsic mental quality ; whereas judgments of con- sciousness do not require this. Again, every judgment of intuition may be accompanied by a corresponding judgment of consciousness; see n. 1: and yet it is remarkable, how seldom it is so accompanied. The judgment of intuition is so absolutely certain, that we do not trouble ourselves to elicit the parallel judgment of consciousness. When I see my children again, spontaneously, and without reflection, I elicit the judg- ment, c These are the faces which I saw a few hours 4 back.' But, unless I am in an unusually philosophical mood, I never think of eliciting formally the parallel judgment of consciousness. I never think of saying to myself, c I am so affected at this moment, that I cannot c help thinking I saw these faces a short time ago.'
This intrinsic quality of the mind then it is, which renders any knowledge possible, beyond the knowledge of my own actually present consciousness. This quality it is, of which a consistent sceptic, if such a thinker were physically possible, would question the existence. This quality it is, which no one, except that impossible mon- ster, can question with any consistency at all. It is through the operation of this quality, that our various thoughts are raised from mere 'intellectual impotencies,' to direct and trustworthy perceptions of Truth. It is through the operation of this quality, and in no other way, that we are enabled to apprehend Objective Keality.
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 33
And by a very natural and obvious figure, this quality is commonly called a * light' to the soul. When actual light is away, we are shut up, each in his own company, and debarred from all direct vision of the external world. And so, were it not for this '-intuitional light,' we should be shut up, without the possibility of escape, in the dreary region of actually present consciousness. Thanks be to God, we possess this light : and in its bright efful- gence, we know our own past history ; we know our fellow-creatures ; we know our Almighty Creator.
And now observe this further inference. There can be no doubt, that acts of memory at least, in one shape or other, proceed throughout our whole waking life. At every instant, we at least call to mind our consciousness of the few preceding instants. Consequently, — even though there were no other legitimate classes of in- tuition except those two which we have been of late specially considering, — an important result would follow, in regard to this c intuitional light/ It is not a quality, like many others, which is generally dormant, and only from time to time called into activity : on the contrary, it puts forth its appropriate operation during every instant of our waking lives.
Philosophers have been occupied from time to time, with greater or less of diligence and success, in investi- gating the nature of this * intuitional light:' and the same question is destined hereafter (I expect) to play a far more important part in such inquiries than it has hitherto done. But it is not requisite for our present theological purposes, to pursue this matter further.
13. Here then we may draw our breath ; having at length brought to an end our protracted train of argu- ment. It will be desirable, before we advance further, that you should again proceed over the ground which we have already traversed ; that you should examine carefully the course of argument, which we have gone through ; and that you should consider how far your reason freely and fully recognises its cogency.
If you have followed me up to this point, you will readily proceed with me one further step.
D
34 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
The Principle of Certitude is, as we have seen, the one key to any knowledge worthy of the name. But so soon as the philosophical edifice has been unlocked and entered, then the question which first meets us on the threshold, will be the test of legitimate intuitions. All reasoning of course must be built upon premisses ; and there must therefore of necessity be a certain number of primary, premisses which are known to us not by reasoning but by intuition. The whole of our knowledge is obtained, and can be obtained, by no other process, than combining and building upon such primary premisses. If then this be so, how vitally important is the task of distinguishing true intuitions from false ! For once suppose our foundation to be erroneous, then in proportion as we reason the more consistently, the more accurately, the more frankly and energetically, so much the more widely mistaken, and in all probability so much the more mischievous, will our conclusions become. This all-important preliminary inquiry, — the mode of distinguishing true intuitions from false, — has met (I cannot but think) with very far less attention from philosophers than was its due. The intellect, as Father Tapparelli incidentally remarks, has two main functions; the intuitive and ratiocinative :* but the former has surely been very far less methodically and systematically treated than the latter.
14. Here however, in order to prevent very pro- bable misconception, I must make two explanatory and qualifying statements.
(1.) I am very far indeed from meaning to imply, that no one can form a legitimate intuition, unless he be himself prepared with .some philosophical test to establish its legitimacy. Far indeed otherwise. The parallel case of inferential judgments will here pre- cisely illustrate what I mean to convey.
There is no more common phenomenon in the world than the following. A man of great natural shrewdness but uncultivated intellect, displays the
* "La faculta intellettiva, nelle due funzioni d'intuito e raziocinio" &c. — Natural Diritto, n. 32.
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 35
greatest acuteness in deciding, what means will or will not be conducive to some end which he has greatly at heart. His reasoning will be most sound from first to last ; yet not only he will be quite unable to give any philosophical test of its validity, but even so much as to state the various premisses on which he proceeds. Now who will be so wild as to maintain, that this man has really no valid ground for his conclusions ? that he is taking them up accidentally and at random, and is as likely to be wrong as to be right ? No : we shall all recognise, that he is using that power of reasoning, which is one of the highest faculties implanted in his nature; and using it most healthily and legitimately: nor shall we under ordinary circumstances have any wish at all, that he should draw out with any greater accuracy the process through which his mind has travelled. Yet on the other hand, if we had to do with a man of totally inaccurate mind, who is leading himself or others into serious mischief by his bad reasoning, we should act otherwise ; we should aim at persuading him to state methodically his various premisses, in order that he may see how ludicrously inadequate they are to his conclusions. And lastly, in the case of philosophical and systematic writers, of them we do most reasonably expect, not merely that they argue correctly, but that they put before us their premisses in sufficient detail ; and not only so, but be prepared also to vindicate the validity of those reasonings which they have built thereon.
The case of intuitions is in every respect similar to this. There are multitudes of men who elicit legi- timate intuitions, who would be wholly unable to state any philosophical test which shall establish that legiti- macy : yet it would be monstrous to say that such intuitions may not most reasonably be trusted. Again there are multitudes of men (other men or the same) who mistake this or that prejudice of their own for a legitimate intuition : and in such instances it is most suitable to urge upon their notice, on philosophical grounds, the spuriousness of such a conviction ; th@
36 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
fact of its being utterly destitute of all pretension to be accounted true and genuine. Lastly, we may most fairly call upon those who profess to write scientifically and to instruct us in philosophy, that they lay down some plain and intelligible method, whereby we may distinguish these true primary premisses from spurious counterfeits ; and that they establish moreover to our satisfaction the reasonableness and sufficiency of that method.
(2.) Now for my second explanatory statement. There are certain intuitions, so intermingled (if I may so express myself) with the very first springs of thought, — such indispensable prerequisites to every intellectual act worthy the name, — that it is simply impossible to apply directly and methodically any test of their legitimacy. Impossible for this reason, that in order to apply any test imaginable, some intellectual act must be elicited ; which act implies, in the very process of eliciting it, ttyat those particular intuitions are genuine. Instances of such intuitions will be those which we have already so often mentioned ; our various intuitions of memory and of reasoning. But then it is these very intuitions, in regard to which each one of us has the strongest possible guarantee for their truth; viz. the fact, that it is not less than physically impossible (see n. 12) to doubt them for one moment.
Again, even as to these most fundamental intuitions, a certain subsequent and negative test of their genuine- ness may be directly and methodically applied. It is imaginable, that my to-day's memory of the events which passed last Sunday, may be contradictory to my yesterday's memory of those same events ; so that by the fact of trusting my memory, I am led into endless contradiction and confusion. It is imaginable again, that the same premisses, if combined in one order, would lead to one conclusion ; if in another, to another and a contradictory conclusion : so that by the fact of trusting my reasoning faculty, I am brought into end- less contradiction and confusion. I need not say that
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 37
nothing of the sort takes place ; but that on the con- trary, the deepest harmony exists between those various propositions, which my memory and my reasoning faculty combine to establish. Here then is a subse- quent and a negative test, yet one of a very cogent description, that those two fundamental classes of in- tuition are genuine.
15. Having so far explained my meaning, I return to my former remark. Philosophers in general have laboured far less, it seems to me, than they ought to have laboured, at the all-important task of providing us with tests, whereby genuine intuitions may be dis- tinguished from spurious. F. Buffier indeed, the well- known Jesuit metaphysician, has applied himself to this work, and deserves no slight praise for seeing its importance and fundamentally ; yet no one, I think, can regard his treatment of the question as very subtle or profound. The tests which he suggests are these three : —
(1.) That the judgments, alleged to be first truths, be so clear, that when one undertakes either to prove or to oppose them, one can only do so by the help of propositions, which are manifestly neither clearer nor more certain.
(2.) That they be so universally received among men in every time and place, and by every sort of character, that those who oppose them find themselves, in comparison to the rest of mankind, not more than one in a hundred or even in a thousand.
(3.) That they be so strongly impressed on our minds, that we conform our conduct to them, notwith- standing the refinements of those who imagine contrary opinions ; which latter class indeed act, not in con- formity with their opinions thus imagined, but with those first truths which are universally received.*
* " Le premier de ces caracteres est qu'elles soient si claires, que quand on entrepreud de les prouver on de les attaquer, on ne le puisse faire, que par des propositions qui rnauifestement ne sont ni plus claires ni plus certaines ;
" D'etre si universellement re9ues parmi les hoinmes en tout temps, en tous lieux, et par toutes sortes d'esprits, que ceux qui les attaquent se
88 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
While admitting that I cannot be satisfied with these three criteria as at all adequate to the occasion, it must not be supposed that I profess in any way to improve upon them.* But I would venture to solicit the serious attention of philosophers to the question ; as I must think that no edifice of metaphysical science can be considered stable and trustworthy, where the security of its very foundation has been so greatly neglected. Until the question of intuitions has been systematically and fully considered, I must think it truer to affirm that most copious and valuable materials for metaphysical science have been brought together, than to affirm that that science itself has been defini- tively called into existence.
For my own part I can only say that, without attempting any general solution of the question, at all events I will not allege any one intuition as legitimate, until I have brought together so many grounds for my statement, as will (I think) satisfy every reflecting man.
16. We have already seen quite enough, to guard us against falling into a fallacy, which need only be stated to be exposed. It happens sometimes, that when we claim intuition in behalf of some important pro- position, certain unphilosophical men, who claim to be specially philosophical, regard that claim itself as a confession of argumentative weakness. When we say plainly that we can advance no chain of syllogisms in behalf of our thesis, they regard this as tantamount with a confession, that we do not allege Reason in its
trouvent, dans le genre humain, 6tre manifestement moins d'un centre cent, ou meme centre mille ;
" D'etre si fortement imprime'es dans nous, que nous y conformions notre conduit, malgre les raffinements de ceux qui imaginent des opinions contraires, et qui eux-memes agissent conforniement, non a leurs opinions imaginees, mais aux premieres verites universellement recues." — Burner, chap. vii. p. 22.
* I have not attempted any methodical consideration of this most im- portant matter, because such consideration would have carried us much too far on purely philosophical ground. Yet I may refer the reader to some remarks in p. 130-133 with the note ; p. 159-161 ; p. 419. If these remarks be admitted as true, they have undoubtedly a bearing on the general ques- tion mentioned in the text.
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 39
behalf at all ; that we cling to it, and admit ourselves to do so, on grounds of fancy, feeling and prepossession, in defiance of Reason. But after the various consider- ations which have occupied us in this Section, it is not necessary to do more than state very briefly the fol- lowing most obvious truth. We are guiding ourselves fully as much by Reason when we hold confidently legitimate intuitions, as when we proceed further to draw inferences from those intuitions. Nay it may be said in one sense, that we go more by Reason in the former case than in the latter ; so far as in every case premisses may be said to possess higher certainty, than the conclusions which they tend to establish. When men thus thoughtlessly call for argument in each particular case, they forget that all argument must depend on certain primary premisses which are not based on argument. If then nothing is reasonable except that for which argument is produceable, those primary premisses are not reasonable ; hence neither are the conclusions based on them reasonable ; and hence again, no knowledge of any kind is possible at all.
If indeed no more is meant by such statements, than that we should be very careful what intuitions we claim as legitimate; — that this must not be left to each man's private fancy, but must proceed on certain fixed and cognizable principles ; — then no more is meant, than what I not merely admit, but have most earnestly maintained. But many men really seem to think (most extravagant as the proposition must appear when for* mally stated) that all intuitions, from the very nature of the case, are and must be the mere offspring of fancy, prejudice, or caprice.
17. This will be a suitable place for such remarks as seem desirable, on the sense which we affix, through- out this Section, to the word 'intuition,' and other kindred terms. What the sense is indeed, in which we have used the word itself, 'intuition' or 'intuitive 4 judgment,' this will be now quite familiar to you. If I merely reflect on my actually present consciousness, I elicit a 'judgment of consciousness.' On the other
40 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
hand, if I regard a certain judgment as resulting from certain others, this act of the mind is an ' act of in- ' ference/ or an ' inferential judgment.' But if I elicit a certain judgment as true self-e violently and not by way of inference, — and if this judgment is not a mere judgment of consciousness, — we call it an ' intuitive act,7 or an ' intuition.' We call it so, without any regard to the question of its truth or falsehood ; and accordingly we subdivide 'intuitions' into 'true' and 'false,' or ' legitimate ' and 4 illegitimate.'
We will further use the verb ' intue,' as corre- sponding in every respect with the substantive ' intui- ' tion,' and the adjective ' intuitive.'
But it is of the utmost importance, to distinguish quite clearly, between the intuing act of the mind on the one hand, and the thing itself intued on the other hand. As no English word is here ready for our use, let us coin the word 'intuern.' I am well aware, of course, how contrary is this word to philological pro- priety; since the word 'intuition' is derived from the Latin and not from the Greek. Still, I am sure you will admit, that, in philosophical discussion, philological propriety should at once give way, where any increase of clearness and accuracy can be obtained. I will define an'intuem,' then, 'a truth legitimately intued.' My present memory of having seen my children yester- day is the 'intuing,' or ' intuitive' act, or the ' intuition ;' the fact itself, now called to mind, that I did then see them, is the ' intuem.'
Various criticisms may probably enough be made on this use of words. It is not worth while, certainly, to speak at any length, on a mere question of verbal propriety. The less so indeed, because at last the one adequate defence of any verbal usage is its proved utility: and this defence it is impossible for you to appreciate, except by proving its utility ; that is, by proceeding with our scientific course. Yet a few words may be in place, to explain why I prefer our sense of the word 'intuitive,' to others which different writers have affixed to it.
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 41
Many philosophers confine the term to our immediate perception of necessary truths. On the meaning of this term ' necessary ' we are to speak very soon ; but you have now probably a sufficient general notion of its sense, to understand what is here intended. My reason for preferring our own use of the term to that employed by these philosophers, is the following. I think it very important, that we should be trained to contemplate, as a class, all those judgments, which, without being mere judgments of consciousness, carry with them their own evidence of truth. These judg- ments agree with each other in this, that a special quality of mind is called into action, to make their truth self-evident. They also agree with each other, in being by necessity the primary premisses, whereon our whole fabric of knowledge is built. If you recognise, with me, the importance of habitually viewing them as a class, you will, of course, at once see, that no way so efficacious can be suggested of securing this, as to call them by a common name.
It may be thought a more questionable usage, that I include false judgments as well as true under the head 4 intuitions.7 To this it will be a sufficient reply, if I point to the parallel use of the word ' reasoning/ Whenever I regard a certain judgment as resulting from certain others, I am said to 'reason;' to arrive at my result by means of ' reasoning : ' and then we distin- guish 'sound' reasoning from 'unsound.' Our usage of the word 'intuition' follows precisely the same analogy.
A final objection may come from an opposite quarter. If the word 'intuition' extends both to 'true' and 6 false' judgments, why is not the word ' intuem' made similarly extensive ? Here again we may point to the common usage of speech, in regard to that other principal operation of the intellect, reasoning. If I reason unsoundly, it is always said that the result at which I arrive is not a real conclusion from the pre- misses. And so, if I ' intue' unsoundly, the thing intued is not a real * intuem.'
42 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
So much then, on the comparatively unimportant question of verbal propriety.
18. Of intuems, some are c necessary,' others not so.* By 'necessary intuem' is meant a verity legiti- mately intued as 'necessarily' true. When, e.g. I intue by memory that five minutes ago I was seated at this table, this truth is no necessary intuem. But when I intue that a rectilineal figure of three sides has three angles, the truth is necessary, and is legi- timately intued as such. As no Catholic philosopher (I believe ) has doubted the existence of necessary truths, and as my direct purpose is not philosophical disquisition, we need not say much in mere explanation of this term 'necessary.' Anything, I suppose, is 'necessarily' true, when its truth arises from nothing whatever external to itself; when its truth arises simply from what is expressed in the subject and in the predicate of that proposition which declares it. Thus the intuern, that I was seated five minutes ago at this table, resulted from the external circumstance that my will then gave my body the requisite command. But the intuem, that every three-sided rectilineal figure has three angles, arises simply from the intrinsic connexion which exists, between a three-sided and a three-angled rectilineal figure. The truth of this latter intuem, I say, does not result, nor is intued by me as resulting, from any external circumstance, as for instance from a Creator commanding that such figures should have such a property ; but is intued as wholly intrinsic to the objects themselves whereof we are judging.
19. This leads the way to a very important philoso- phical discussion. We believe of course most firmly, and believe as a truth which Reason by itself can establish, that there exists an All-holy, Almighty God, Infinite in every Perfection, The One Necessary Self- existent Being. Here then a difficulty presents itself,
* It can hardly be requisite to remark, that, throughout this Chapter, where I speak of ' necessity,' I invariably mean what is called ' metaphy- sical necessity,' as distinct from ' physical ' or ' moral.' These three distinctions correspond to the three distinctions of objective certainty : see p. 427, 8.
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 43
which will more and more make itself felt, in proportion as we more carefully ponder on the relations which must exist between God and Necessary Truth. Let us enquire then, as a preliminary step, what is the relation in which Necessary Truth stands, to the Intellect and the Will of this Adorable Being. We assume His existence ; and we proceed upon that assumption. Nor can we take a better instance of Necessary Truth, than the axioms and theorems of Geometry.
Let us consider then two propositions, which are im- plied by this word 'necessary,' in regard to Mathematical Truth, and its relation to God's Intellect and Will.
(1.) Necessary truths do not derive their verity, from the fact that God necessarily intues them. Rather the very opposite is the fact : God necessarily intues them, because they are necessary truths. Who would say e. g. that God is necessarily Self-Existent, because He intues Himself to be so ? On the contrary of course : He intues Himself to be so, because He is so. In like manner He necessarily intues the base angles of an isosceles triangle to be necessarily equal, because they are necessarily equal : He necessarily intues that the three angles of every triangle together necessarily equal two right angles, or that the square of the hypo- thenuse necessarily equals the sum of the squares of the sides, because in each instance the truth is so.
It is indeed (as is manifest) the very excellence of God's Intellect, that it is necessarily determined by Truth ; or (in other words) His Intellectual Perception depends on Truth, not Truth upon His Intellectual Perception.
What Vasquez says of Moral Truth, is applicable to all Necessary Truth of whatsoever kind, 'Ante omnem ' Dei Voluntatem et Imperium, immo etiam ante omne 4 JudiciumJ this truth must be conceived as existing ; ' praecedens, secundum rationem, omne Judicium Divini « Intellects.' (In lm 2" d. 150, n. 23.) It follows therefore, that through all Eternity God is constantly and necessarily gazing on the vast mass of Necessary Mathematical Truth.
44 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
(2.) It is not only certain that necessary truths are not derived from God's intuition of them, but that in some sense they seem to limit His Power. God cannot create a rectilineal figure of three sides, which has more or less than three angles ; or again, whose angles taken together amount to either more or less than two right angles.
Here then we are brought face to face with the difficulties which I mentioned as existing. Is the assertion endurable, that God is gazing through all Eternity on some mass of Necessary Truth, external to and independent of Himself? on Truth, co-eternal with Himself, and yet distinct from Himself? on Truth, equally necessary with Himself, and yet not Himself? Again, is the assertion endurable, that God's Power is limited by something external to Himself? not by His Own Intrinsic Perfections (as e. g. He is unable to destroy Himself because of His Necessary Self-exist- ence) but by some body of external Truth ? I ask again, is either of these assertions endurable ? It is plain that neither could be tolerated by any reflecting Theist. And yet, if we wish to avoid this, there is but one possible resource ; in other words, we are led by com- pulsion to one very definite conclusion. We are led to infer, that Necessary Truth is not distinct from God Himself; that (in some way wholly incom- prehensible to us) it is identified with Him; that, in gazing on it, He is not gazing on something external to Himself, but merely penetrating and comprehending the depths of His Own Nature; that when His Power is limited by it, it is limited by no external shackle, but by His Own Intrinsic Essence. That this fact is totally mysterious, I of course fully admit; though really not more so, than is every proposition which concerns the Incomprehensible Creator. It is totally mysterious : but there is no difficulty whatever (so far as I am aware) in the way of our receiving it. Nor does it seem to me possible to avoid this precise conclusion. It seems to me that we are brought, by the very exigency of the case, to that one hypothesis, which avoids all difficulties,
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 45
and harmonizes all data ; that hypothesis, which admits all that Reason testifies, on the absolute independence possessed by Necessary Truth; while it even deepens and intensifies our apprehension of God's Greatness and Incommunicable Necessity.
This then is our conclusion. All Necessary Truth is identical with God ; in intuing it, I really intue the One Necessary Ens; though in this, as in so many other cases, I may be very far from recognising the full extent of the Object which I contemplate. God, in intuing Necessary Truth, intues Himself; a creature, in intuing Necessary Truth, intues God.
Nor is there absence of high Catholic authority in support of this view ; Bossuet, e. g. states the doctrine which we advocate in the strongest and most express terms :
Tout ce qui se demontre en Mathematique, et en quelque autre science que ce soit, est eternel et immuable : puisque Peffet de la demonstration est de faire voir que la chose ne peut etre autrement qu'elle est demon tree.
Aussi, pour entendre la nature et les proprietes des choses que je connois, par exemple, ou d'un triangle, ou d'un carre, ou d'un cercle, ou les proportions de ces figures, et de toutes autres figures entre elles, je n'ai pas besoin de savoir qu'il y en ait de telles dans la nature ; et je suis assure* de n'en avoir jamais ni trace ni vu de parf'aites. Je n'ai pas besoin non plus de songer qu'il y ait quelques mouvemens dans le monde, pour entendre la nature du mouvement meme, ou celle des lignes que chaque mouvement decrit, les suites de ce mouvement, et les proportions selon les- quelles il augmente ou diminue dans les graves et les choses jetees. Des que 1'idee de ces choses s'est une fois reveillee dans mon esprit, je connois que, soit qu'elles soiente, ou qu'elles ne soient pas actuellement, c'est ainsi qu'elles doivent £tre, et qu'il est impossible qu'elles soient d'une autre nature, ou so fassent d'une autre fa^on.
Et pour venir a quelque chose qui nous touche de plus pres, j'entends, par ces principes de verite eternelle, que quand aucun autre etre que 1'homme, et moi-meme ne serions pas actuellement ; quand Dieu auroit resolu de n'en creer aucun autre ; le devoir essentiel de I'homme, d£s-la qu'il est capable de raisonner, est de vivre selon la Raison, et de chercher son Auteur, de peur de lui manquer de reconnoissance, si, faute de le chercher, il 1'ignoroit.
Toutes ces verites, et toutes celles que j'en deduis par un
46 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
raisonnement certain, subsistent independamment de tons l*>s temps: en qnelqne temps que je mette un entendement humain, il les connoitra ; mais, en les connoissant, il les trouvera verites, il ne \vsfera pas telles: car ce ne sont pas nos connoissances qni font leurs objets ; elles les supposent. Ainsi ces verites subsistent (levant tous les siecles, et devant qu'il y ait eu un entendement humain : et quand tout ce qui se fait par les regies des proportions, c'est-a- dire tout ce que je vois dans la nature, seroit detruit, excepte moi, ces regies se conserveroient dans ma pensee ; et je verrois claire- rnent qu'elles seroient toujours bonnes et toujours veritable?, quand moi-meme je serois detruit, et quand il n'y auroit personne qui fut capable de les comprendre.
Si je chercJie maintenant, ou, et en quel sujet elles subsistent e'ternelles et immuables, comme elles sont, je suis oblige d'avouer un Eire, ou la verite est Eternellement subsistante, et ou elie est toujours entendue ; et cet Etre doit etrela Verite meme, et doitetre toute Verite; et c'est de Lui que la verite derive, dans tout ce qui est et ce qui s'entend hors de lui.
C'est done en Lui, d'une certaine maniere qui rrfest incomprd- hensible, c^est en Lui, dis-je, que^'e vois ces verites dternelles ; et les voir, c'est me tourner a Celui, qui est immuablement toute Verite, et recevoir Ses Lumieres.
Cet Objet Eternel, c'est Dieu, eternellement Subsistant, eter- nellement Veritable, eternellement la Verite meme. — De la Con- noissance de Dieu et de Soi-meme, cap. iv. n. o.
I was led to this passage of Bossuet, by a work of M. Jourdain on St. Thomas's Philosophy. The author adds, that c les maitres les plus autorises de la philosophic du 17e siecle . . tombent d'accord avec Bossuet 'in this statement (vol. ii. p. 375). Fenelon certainly holds the same doctrine ; as large passages from his work on the Existence of God amply demonstrate. The following may suffice: —
Toutes nos connaissances universelles ont Dieu meme pour Objet fmmediat ; mais Dieu considere avec certaine precision, par rapport aux divers degres selon lesquels il peut communiquer Son Eire.— Part 2, n. 56.
The 'Prselectiones Philosophies,' used at St. Sulpice, make the same statement : —
f In Essentia Diviria continentur relationes essentiales et neces- sariaB rerum.' — n. 1557.
Nay, M. Jourdain tells us that William of Auvergne, as bishop, condemned in the year 1240 the ' heretical
ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 47
' proposition/ c qu'il y a des ve*rites e*ternelles, qui ne 'sont pas Dieu meine.' (Vol. i. p, 51.)
A little research would enable me (no doubt) to accumulate a large number of such passages, from the highest authorities. But there is no need of such research ; for the conclusion is one, which will at once commend itself both to the judgment and feelings of all devout Catholics.*
20. Having now then sufficiently prepared the way, for those theses which I am mainly anxious to prove, I shall here close the present Section, the various pro- positions, which we have (I think) established in the course of it, are very closely connected with philo- sophical controversies, which have been at all times most keenly and earnestly discussed, and never more so than at the present time. I have endeavoured how- ever to steer clear of these controversies, so far as was consistent with what was absolutely necessary for my design. Not that I regard these controversies as unim- portant : on the contrary, they appear to me vitally momentous ; and perhaps more so now than at any former period. Nor has the reason of my procedure altogether been, that I am without a decided opinion upon them ; for on some of the matters at issue, I have been led to form a very decided opinion. But my direct subject being Theology and not Philosophy, I have felt all through, that it was very desirable to con- fine strictly our philosophical discussions to the estab- lishment of those truths, which are indispensably requisite as a foundation for what is to follow.
* A very able and learned writer in the 'Dublin Review' (June 1857, p. 411, note) has some remarks on this doctrine. I do not understand him however to question it, but to deprecate its adoption as the basis of ' Ethi- cal Science :' 'it were an unsuitable basis,' he says, 'on which to build up * Ethical Science.' And I the rather think this must be the writer's mean- ing, because only a few pages back he himself seems to have asserted the same doctrine. ' Necessary and absolute ideas,' he remarks (p. 407) { are 'the Divine Idea itself, presenting itself under different aspects.'
It is a very interesting question, and one which it is very desirable that some competent person should treat, how far the scholastics, in all which they say about the immutable essences of things, do not tend in some measure to imply the doctrine stated in the text. See a very remarkable passage in Vasquez, on the 1' 2'e, d. 97, n. 9.
48
SECTION II.
On the Essential Characteristics of Moral Truth.
i
21. We may begin this Section, by stating two or three extremely simple moral judgments, which would be formed spontaneously by any human being, who should know the circumstances of the respective cases. The first judgment given shall contain the special idea of moral obligation.
A friend of mine, who has loaded me with benefits, entrusts to my keeping a jewel of great value, for the sake of its safe custody ; while he goes to seek his for- tune in other lands. He returns in a state of great distress, and reclaims his jewel. I recognise imme- diately, and without the faintest shadow of doubt, that I ought to restore it ; or in other words that I am under the moral obligation of restoring it.
Now, before going further, let us consider what is precisely meant here by the phrsse 'moral obligation.' When I say that I am under the moral obligation of restoring the jewel, I mean neither more nor less than that the not restoring it would be ' morally evil.' If we examine our own consciousness, we shall find that invariably this term ' moral obligation ' is but corre- lative to the other term ' morally evil.7 When I say that such an act, under such circumstances, is of 'moral obligation,' I mean neither more nor less, than that to abstain from doing it would be 'morally evil.' When I say that c the avoidance of such an act would be of moral obligation/ I mean that ' the doing it would be morally evil.' The term ' moral obligation ' then, by no means need imply the existence of some other person,
THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 49
who imposes the obligation;* it implies no more, than the existence in certain acts of this quality, 'moral evil.'f Of this particular term ' moral obligation ' then, I need not make any further explicit mention ; because its explanation is necessarily contained, in the explanation of its correlative ' morally evil.*
The first moral judgment then, which I have given for illustration, may be stated thus : ' to refuse restora- tion of the jewel under these circumstances would be morally evil/
Take this as a second judgment. A rich man, instead of giving himself up to luxurious indolence, devotes himself indefatigably to some object of great public importance. If I believe that his motives for doing so are pure and simple, I judge that this conduct is 4 morally good.'
And take this as a third judgment. A and B are two men of my acquaintance. A devotes the main current of his life, — devotes his labour, his time, his wealth, — to instructing the ignorant, relieving the dis- tressed, promoting the cause of virtue. B on the other
* " Ceux qui ne veulent pas, que la connaissance du juste et de Vinjuste suffise pour imposer une obligation proprement dite, sont fort embarrasses de trouver le fondement de Fobligation a la Loi Naturelle." — Gerdil, to be quoted at length in Sec. iv.
t The text is so worded as to imply a doctrine, which I hold to be certainly true ; viz., that the ' malitia ' of a bad act is a positive attribute : This question is to be considered, among others, in the third Book ; nor •would it have been alluded to here, had there not been an impression (as I find) in the mind of some Catholics, that the doctrine which I follow is of questionable theological soundness. Some Catholics, I say, are under the impression, that there is at least a consent of theologians in favour of a. proposition, contradictory to our doctrine ; the proposition, namely, that the ' malitia ' of an evil act consists entirely in the ' privatio rectitudinis debitse.' The following extract will abundantly show how totally mistaken is any such impression ; and how completely the question is an open one among theologians. It is taken from the ' Theol >gia Scholastica ' of that well-known English theologian, F. Compton Carleton, S. J.
'Secunda ergo et probabilior sententia affirmat, malitiam moralcm actus peccaminosi consistere in aliquo positive, positivd scilicet difformitate ad rectam rationem. Ita Medina ; Bannez ; Zamel ; Caietanus, asserens se non ausurum fuisse hoc dicere, nisi id clare docuisset S. Thomas. Addit tamen huic actui Caietanus aliam malitiam privativam, in carentia rectitudinis sitam. . . Eandem sententiam sequitur Vasquez, Lessius, Erice, Coninck, Gabriel, Raymundus, Arriaga, Amicus ; estque communissima hodie inter recentiores opinio.' — d. 100, § 3, n. 1.
E
50 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
hand, without grossly neglecting any of his immediate duties, leads on the whole a life of great comfort and enjoyment. If I believe A's motives to be good, I judge without the slightest doubt that A's course of life is * morally better ' than B's.
These three judgments, I need not say, are very closely related to each other. In the first, I hold that a certain act is 'morally evil;' in the second, that a certain course of life or series of acts is 'morally good;' in the third, that one course of life or series of acts is more ' morally good ' than another. I have the idea then, however I came by it, of a certain quality which I call ' moral goodness.' This quality is of such funda- mental importance, that no more momentous question can possibly engage our mind, than an examination into its real nature.
I begin with making one statement, which will be found (1 think) of the utmost value, both in promoting clearness of thought on the subject, and also in serving as a basis for the argument which will succeed. The idea, expressed by this term 'morally good,' is a 'simple' idea. And in a matter of such very great importance, you must allow me to proceed, first of all, at some little length, in merely explaining what is meant by this statement.
22. The idea expressed by the term ' sweet,' — when I judge e. g. that this lump of sugar is 'sweet' — is a simple idea. I may explain ' sweet ' indeed, by saying that it is the opposite to ' bitter ;' just as I may explain ' bitter ' by saying that it is the opposite to ' sweet.' But any further explanation than this is impossible : he who has never experienced the sensation in question, can- not possibly understand the term. So I may explain ' morally good,' by saying it is the opposite to ' morally evil ;' or I may explain ' morally evil,' by saying it is the opposite to ' morally good.' But I maintain that WKJ further explanation of the term is impossible ; that if a man had never experienced the exact thought in question, he would not by possibility be made to under- stand the term.
TUB ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 51
The opposite to a ' simple idea ' is a { complex idea ;' and the great majority of those which the mind con- ceives are of this character. Take for instance that idea, which we express by the term l a poetical tempera- ment:'— of how many simple ideas is it not composed! Numbers of men no doubt use the term, having learned from others to use it with this or that application, who attach to it very little definite meaning. But how different is the case with those who intelligently apply it ! That it is a most complex idea, is admitted by all philosophers : what precisely are those simple ideas whereof it consists, — this is among the most difficult, as among the most interesting, of psychological ques- tions. There are certain qualities of mind, which are found, in certain marked instances, to exist together in very special intensity ; while other qualities are not found to exist in all these marked instances to any intense degree. From the fact of the former qualities being so often found united with each other in special intensity, we think of them in combination; and we give to that combination a name of its own. But to resolve that combination into its component parts, — in other words, to analyse that complex idea into the simple ideas of which it consists, — this requires the most care- ful and accurate observation.
Let us suppose the analysis rightly performed. By a 'poetical temperament' then, is meant the possession in an intense degree of certain mental qualities ; A, B, C, D, and E.
Enough has been said to show how complex is the idea expressed by that phrase, — c the poetical tempera- ment.' For another illustration, consider how complex is the idea which we express, in saying that ' A and B are attached friends.' That they sincerely desire each other's welfare, — this is part of the idea: but how much more does it not also contain!
A third instance shall be given, because of its theo- logical importance. The One Perfectly Simple Being, Who exists or possibly can exist, is Almighty God : and
52 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.
moreover, if we are so happy as hereafter to see Him in Heaven, that idea of Him, which we shall receive from His Facial Vision, will be simple even as He is Simple. But here in via our idea of Him becomes more complex, in proportion as it becomes more real and definite. We may think of Him vaguely, as the ' Cumulus of all Perfections : ' but if we wish to grow in His knowledge and love, we must obtain of Him a far more real and definite notion. How do I form for myself such a notion ? I ponder on one Perfection after another: Power, Knowledge, Sanctity, and the rest ; and I reflect on His possessing all these per- fections in infinite extent. The highly complex idea which I thus obtain, is a very real knowledge of Him, so far as it goes ; and it is the nearest approach to a full knowledge which we can possibly gain, so long as we are exiles (alas!) from our True Home.
But as there are c complex ideas,' so evidently there must be 'simple ideas.' Complex ideas are analysed into simpler ones; these again perhaps, into others simpler still. At length then, we must come to a position where further analysis is impossible; a posi- tion where the ideas, into which we have decomposed the original idea, are themselves perfectly simple.
23. We are now able to understand two terms, which are frequently used by modern philosophers, and which will greatly assist us in our subsequent enquiries. Some judgments are ' analytical,' others c synthetical.' And in like manner, — since a ' proposition ' is merely the verbal expression of a 'judgment,' — some pro- positions are ' analytical,' and others ' synthetical.'
An ' analytical 'judgment is one, in which it is judged that the idea of one term is contained in the very idea of the other.* Thus if I say that 'he who possesses a 4 poetical temperament, possesses in an intense degree * the qualities B and E,' I shall be forming an analyti-
* Perhaps I should make some apology for using the words 'term,' ' subject,' ' predicate ' (both here and elsewhere), not only when speaking of propositions, but of judgments not expressed in words.
THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 53
cal judgment; for I consider that the idea of possessing these qualities in an intense degree, is contained in the very idea ' a poetical temperament.'
Those judgments, which are not ( analytical,' are called ' synthetical :' and we may give an illustration or two almost at random, for the purpose of making clearer the distinction between these two classes. Sup- pose I form this judgment ; ' my parents were instru- ' mental to my birth into the world :' here is an ' analy- tical ' judgment ; this is part of what I mean, when I say 'my parents.' But suppose I form this judgment; ' my parents should be honoured and obeyed by me : ' here is a ' synthetical judgment.' We may consider this latter judgment indeed to be intuitively evident: but still the idea of * claiming justly my honour and obedience,' is not part of the idea which I express, when I say i my parents.' Another illustration may be taken from a thesis, which I argue in the fifth Section of the second Chapter. To judge that happiness consists in a gratification of the propensions, — is to elicit an 'ana- lytical' judgment: the judgment results at once, from considering what is meant by ' happiness,' ' propension,' 'gratification.' But to judge that 'earthly happiness 4 is most surely obtained by means of virtue,' — this, however true, is no 'analytical' judgment: its truth is made manifest, by examining, not the sense of words, but the properties of things.
Analytical judgments may be ' true ' or ' false ;' for it is evident that I may be mistaken in my opinion, that this idea is contained in that. In regard to the more complicated phenomena even of my own mind, I may make very serious mistakes when I attempt their analysis.
A second division of analytical ' judgments may be into ' objective '